Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2018

Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal
Immigration Power and the Constitution
Jennifer Gordon
Fordham University School of Law, jgordon@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer Gordon, Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the
Constitution, 93 Ind. L. J. 653 (2018)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/864

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Indiana Law Journal
Volume 93

Issue 3

Article 3

Summer 2018

Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal
Immigration Power and the Constitution
Jennifer Gordon
Fordham Law School, jgordon@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gordon, Jennifer (2018) "Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and
the Constitution," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 93 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Immigration as Commerce:
A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the
Constitution
JENNIFER GORDON
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 654
I. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE .................. 659
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A SOURCE OF THE IMMIGRATION POWER............. 671
A. THE LOST SOURCE: THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE ......................... 671
B. A NEW SOURCE: THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE ......................... 681
THE MODERN JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE CLAUSE ...................................................................... 681
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR ROOTING THE IMMIGRATION POWER IN THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TODAY ............................................................................ 687
A. IMMIGRATION AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY............................................. 687
B. THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE ARGUMENT ...................................... 689
C. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE ARGUMENT ................................ 693
1. IMMIGRATION IN RELATION TO MODERN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE........................................... 693
2. DISCUSSION OF IMMIGRATION AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN
CONTEMPORARY CASE LAW ......................................................... 698
D. WHAT DO WE GET FROM CONCEIVING OF IMMIGRATION
AS COMMERCE? ...................................................................................... 701
1. IMPACT OVERALL ........................................................................... 701
2. IMPACT ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DIFFERENT
CLASSES OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES ............................................. 703
A. IMMIGRATION POLICIES RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOR COMPETITION .................................................................... 703
B. IMMIGRATION POLICIES NOT RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT OR
NATIONAL SECURITY ............................................................................. 704
C. IMMIGRATION POLICIES RELATED TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY .............................................................................. 708
3. THE SAME END BY DIFFERENT MEANS?......................................... 710
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 711

 Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author would like to thank
the following individuals for very helpful comments on earlier drafts: Rose Cuison-Villazor,
Nestor Davidson, Lee Gelernt, Abner Greene, Clare Huntington, Andrew Kent, Joe Landau,
Thomas Lee, Stephen Legomsky, Robin Lenhardt, Catherine Powell, Jed Shugerman, and
Benjamin Zipursky. Thanks also to my colleague Aaron Saiger for a conversation several
years ago that prompted me to begin exploring this topic. My research for this Article
benefitted from the early assistance of Krista Hahn Blumenberg, support from Emerson
Argueta at a critical moment, and the tireless dedication of Alex Mintz throughout.

654

I NDI ANA LA W JOUR NA L

[Vol. 93:653

INTRODUCTION
When the United States government sets immigration law and policy, how much
attention must it pay to constitutional rights? This question has been much debated
since President Donald Trump issued a series of immigration-related executive
orders in his first week in office, including a bar on entry by citizens of a set of
majority-Muslim countries, but it was controversial long before then. In important
part, the answer depends on what the Constitution says about the scope and limits of
the power of the federal government over immigration. Therein lies the tale. On this
subject, the country’s founding documents say very little, and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations have been inconsistent at best.
For well over a century, federal courts have often relied on the theory that the
immigration authority is rooted in the Constitution’s grant to the federal government
of control over matters related to sovereignty and foreign affairs. This explanation
forms the basis of the plenary power doctrine, first announced in 1889 and applied
by the Supreme Court most recently in 2018. The doctrine grants Congress and the
executive branch nearly unreviewable powers in the immigration arena. This Article
offers an alternative. It asserts that immigration to the United States is and has long
been principally economic in its purpose and impact and thus in many cases is
properly considered a function of both the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses.
The constitutional source of a particular authority of a branch of the government does
not wholly determine the degree of constitutional review that courts will exercise,
but it is an important factor. An immigration power rooted in the Commerce Clause,
the Article argues, would put a thumb on the scale in favor of ordinary judicial review
for immigration statutes, rules, and policies challenged as violating constitutional
rights.
The argument that the immigration power grows from the Foreign Commerce
Clause has a “Return of the Jedi” quality. For half of the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court did ground the immigration power in the Constitution’s explicit
statement that the federal government has control over commerce with foreign
nations.1 In the mid-1800s, when immigration first became seen as a national rather
than state issue, courts treated the federal immigration power as an ordinary function
of the Foreign Commerce Clause and relied on this theory to sustain the federal
government’s right to tax ships that transported newcomers to the United States.
While plenary in the sense that it granted control over immigration to the federal
rather than the state governments, this power appeared to be subject to ordinary
constitutional limitations.
This era came to an end with the Court’s announcement of the plenary power
doctrine in the Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889.2 There, the Supreme Court declared
that Congress and the President have a near-absolute power to control immigration,
with the corollary that courts should be highly deferential to the political branches

1. The Commerce Clause grants this power to Congress, not to the Executive Branch.
Later in this Article, I argue that the Executive Branch shares in this power, both because of
its role as the enforcer of congressional policies, and because of its independent authority. See
infra notes 197–198 and accompanying text.
2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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when reviewing such decisions for constitutionality.3 For over 125 years,
intermittently, but particularly at times of peak concern about national security, the
Supreme Court has relied on this plenary power doctrine in limiting the extent of
constitutional review of immigration policies that facially discriminated against
individuals on the basis of their race, nationality, political beliefs, or gender.
In the contemporary era, the Supreme Court’s reliance on the plenary power
doctrine has fluctuated. In a number of cases, the Court has ignored the doctrine,
leading many scholars to predict its demise.4 In others, it has relied on it, including
in its recent decision on President Trump’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii.5 In no
case has the Court overruled the doctrine, or even offered an explicit critique, and
the justices have proposed no alternative theory to take its place. Plenary power
arguments make consistent appearances in contemporary briefs, including those filed
by the Trump administration,6 and in lower court decisions as well.7
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided three cases that raised issues about the
relationship of the Constitution to immigration law.8 Despite hopes that this trilogy
of cases would offer the Court the opportunity to articulate a consistent framework
for its approach to constitutional review in the immigration context, the decisions
only further muddied the waters. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court deferred a
constitutional reckoning on the due process implications of unlimited mandatory
detention for noncitizens pending determination of deportability.9 In Sessions v.
Dimaya, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court reached new heights of constitutional
oversight of Congress’s actions on immigration, for the first time striking down a
substantive deportation ground as unconstitutional after finding that it was void for
vagueness.10 Rather than approaching plenary power doctrine head on, the 5-4
majority in Dimaya simply ignored it, robustly reviewing the immigration statute

3. Id. at 602–03.
4. E.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 117–18 (2015); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP.
CT. REV. 255, 305; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 934 (1995).
5. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418–20 (2018); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003). The controlling opinion in a recent Supreme Court plurality decision
also cited plenary power with approval. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
6. E.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 15–19, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 471 (2016) (No. 15-1204).
7. E.g., Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 37 (D. Mass. 2017).
8. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (challenging the third version of President
Trump’s “travel ban” as a violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause); Sessions
v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (challenging the “crime of violence” deportation ground as
unconstitutionally vague); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (challenging the
denial of bond hearings to noncitizens mandatorily detained for longer than six months as a
violation of due process).
9. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
10. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
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without referring to the doctrine. Dimaya makes history without acknowledging that
it does so.11
By contrast, in Trump v. Hawaii, the most closely watched of the decisions, the
Court relied heavily on the plenary power doctrine in upholding the third iteration of
President Trump’s travel ban, which barred entry to most citizens of six majorityMuslim countries, together with North Koreans and some officials from Venezuela.12
In a 5-4 decision, it rejected arguments that the President’s Proclamation barring
entry to the United States of citizens of mostly majority-Muslim countries, following
his repeated promises to create a “Muslim Ban,” violated either the Immigration and
Nationality Act or the Establishment Clause.13 Instead, the opinion cleared a broad
path for essentially unreviewable presidential action in the immigration arena.14
At this moment of incoherence in the relationship of immigration law to the
Constitution, and of urgent need for clarity, this Article advances the Commerce
Clause as the anchor of a new understanding of the relationship between the
Constitution and immigration law and policy. Currently, the Commerce Clause plays
almost no role in immigration jurisprudence. Despite the extensive early history of
the Foreign Commerce Clause as the presumed source of the immigration power,
few scholars have seriously considered its contemporary suitability for that role.15
More strikingly, none have explored the Interstate Commerce Clause as an
appropriate source of the immigration power and one that could open the door to a
normalization of constitutional analysis in the immigration context.16

11. Id.
12. Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the
United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed.
Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
13. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435–36 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(setting out statements made by President Trump during his campaign and while in office
regarding the travel ban).
14. See, e.g., id. at 2409, 2421–22. For a fuller discussion of Trump v. Hawaii, Sessions
v. Dimaya, and Jennings v. Rodriguez, see infra Parts I, II.D.2.b.
15. The principal treatments of this issue are historical in focus. See, e.g., Kif AugustineAdams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 718–
721 (2005); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves,
and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743 passim (1996); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L REV. 1, 99–112 (2002); Matthew J. Lindsay,
Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration
Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2010). Others have suggested more briefly that
the Foreign Commerce Clause might be an appropriate contemporary source for the
immigration power. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 186 (1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation
of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 864, 866 (1989); Jack M. Balkin,
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2010) (arguing that his “interaction theory” of foreign
commerce “best explains and justifies Congress’s powers over immigration.”); Gabriel J.
Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1998).
16. The closest to such a discussion that I have seen is Cristina Rodríguez’s mention of
the potential impact of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on the reformulation of
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Given the outsized economic impact of immigration on the United States during
the past two centuries, the absence of contemporary discussion about the relationship
between the Commerce Clause and the immigration power comes as a surprise.
Immigration to the United States was fundamentally an economic phenomenon at
the nation’s founding, and the courts soon acknowledged as much by grounding it in
the Foreign Commerce Clause. And it is fundamentally an economic phenomenon
today.17 Most newcomers arrive in search of more, better, or higher-paying work.
Even those admitted in noneconomic categories—as refugees, to study, to be
reunited with relatives—are likely to seek a job soon after arrival.18 The numbers tell
the story: currently, twenty-seven million permanent, temporary, and undocumented
immigrants make up almost seventeen percent of the U.S. labor force, a higher
percentage than at any other point in the nation’s history and a labor market
participation rate far higher than natives.19 Immigrants work in rural areas, suburbs,
and metropolises throughout the nation.
By highlighting this longstanding aspect of immigration, and with it the
Commerce Clause as an additional source of government power, the Article seeks to
clear a pathway to more consistent judicial consideration of constitutional rights in
the immigration context. Drawing on the history of the Supreme Court’s early
immigration jurisprudence rooting the immigration power in the Foreign Commerce
Clause, and on data demonstrating immigrants’ higher level of engagement with
national and interstate labor markets compared to natives, and their greater interstate
mobility in search of work,20 it argues that immigration today is fundamentally
economic in its impact and thus properly considered a function of both the Foreign
and Interstate Commerce Clauses.
The consideration of the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the
immigration power is one of the Article’s unique contributions. Changes in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the twentieth century have extended the
understanding of “commerce” beyond international or interstate transportation of
goods or people to include direct regulation of individuals crossing national or state
borders for economic reasons. Meanwhile, when the New Deal Interstate Commerce
Clause cases expanded the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause, it, too, became
available to ground the immigration power.
Beginning with United States v. Lopez in 1995, the Supreme Court has sought to
rein in Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.21 Yet, the Article contends,

the division between federal and state/local spheres of immigrant regulation. Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567,
629–630 (2008).
17. On the economic nature of immigration in the history of the United States, see
generally MICHAEL J. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE (1979); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY
DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006).
18. Cf. ZOLBERG, supra note 17, at 14 (“In the perspective of capitalist dynamics,
immigrants of any kind—including refugees—are considered primarily as ‘labor.’”).
19. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics
Summary (May 18, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VE9V-KKJP].
20. See infra Part II.
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Since then, the boundaries of the Commerce Clause have
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even the more restrictive contemporary understanding of interstate commerce leaves
room for the Interstate Commerce Clause to encompass federal action on
immigration. Immigrants are a central force in the United States economy. This
Article asserts that law and policy on immigration fundamentally serves both as
regulation of interstate commerce in the form of the national labor market and as
regulation of individuals in interstate commerce.
To be clear, were the Court to accept the Commerce Clause as an appropriate
source of the modern immigration power, broader judicial review of the
constitutionality of immigration-related laws or policies would not follow
automatically.22 Other doctrines—such as limits on the extraterritorial application of
the Constitution, the Court’s habitual deference in the face of the government’s
assertion of national security concerns, and the conceptual link between sovereignty
and immigration—seem likely to continue to cast a shadow over Supreme Court
review of the political branches’ determinations about admission and deportation
categories and processes. Yet an explicit recognition of the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and the immigration power has the potential to contribute to a
constructive reconsideration of jurisprudence regarding the constitutional norms that
should govern immigration policies.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly traces the evolution of the plenary
power doctrine from its introduction in the late 1800s through 2018, with particular
attention to the Court’s ambivalence toward and frequent abdication of constitutional
review in the immigration context. Part II turns to the Commerce Clause as an
additional source of the immigration power. It highlights the view widely held earlier
in the nineteenth century that immigration was commerce, which supported the
Supreme Court’s attribution at the time of the federal government’s authority over
immigration to the Foreign Commerce Clause. It then contends that changes in the
jurisprudence of the Interstate Commerce Clause during the New Deal have rendered
the Interstate Commerce Clause available as an underlying source of the
government’s authority to make immigration laws and policies, notwithstanding
some retrenchment on the scope of interstate commerce since the Supreme Court’s
Lopez decision in 1995. Part III argues that both the Foreign and the Interstate
Commerce Clauses should be understood to undergird the immigration power today
and suggests that acknowledging immigration’s relationship to the Commerce

remained somewhat fluid, with cases such as United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012),
reinforcing the limits of interstate commerce, and cases such as Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005), suggesting a return to openness. See infra Part II.B for discussion of the current legal
landscape regarding the Interstate Commerce Clause and its implications for the immigration
power as an outgrowth of that Clause.
22. The relationship between constitutional powers and constitutional rights is its own
field, a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a sense of the scope
of debate in this area, see Symposium, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27
GA. L. REV. 343 (1993). For my purposes, it suffices to note that the clause of the Constitution
that grants the government a particular power influences, but is not the only determinant of
the degree to which the Court will recognize individual constitutional rights as a constraint on
that power.
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Clause clears a path to more routine judicial review of immigration laws for
constitutionality.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
Early in his presidency, Donald Trump asserted that the United States faced a
crisis of national security that justified immediate Executive Branch action with
regard to immigration.23 In a series of executive orders issued during his first weeks
in office, President Trump followed through on his campaign promises to bar
Muslims from entering the United States24 and to create ideological tests to screen
would-be immigrants for American values.25 Faced with what appeared to be a policy
of facial discrimination against immigrants on the basis of religion,26 advocates for
and scholars of constitutional rights alike cried foul.27 Immigration scholars,

23. See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan.
25, 2017) (Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States); and Exec. Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
into the United States).
24. Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Calls for Barring Muslims from
Entering U.S., N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (Dec. 7, 2015, 4:36 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banningmuslims-from-entering-u-s [https://perma.cc/6V6M-2QS5].
25. As to the President’s campaign promises, see David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman,
Donald Trump’s Terrorism Plan Mixes Cold War Concepts and Limits on Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/politics/donald-trumpterrorism.html [https://perma.cc/3PBP-GPXP]; Christina Wilkie & Elise Foley, Donald
Trump Proposes Ideological Test for Entry to the United States, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16,
2016,
5:02
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-immigrationtest_us_57b224c9e4b007c36e4fc81e [https://perma.cc/UD3M-D4RN]. As to his execution of
those promises, see sources cited supra note 23.
26. For a detailed exploration of the last time a President sought to apply restrictions to
men from predominately Muslim countries, in the wake of 9/11, and the outcome of court
challenges to that policy, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and
the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010); see also Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017).
27. When President Trump campaigned on these promises, constitutional experts
declared that they would likely be struck down by the Supreme Court as facial violations of
fundamental rights. E.g., Ari Melber, Constitutional Scholars: Trump’s Anti-Muslim
Immigration Proposal Is Probably Illegal, MSNBC (Dec. 7, 2015, 10:27 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-anti-muslim-proposal-probably-illegal
[https://perma.cc/FUT8-6H93]; Ari Melber, Legal Scholar: Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Probably
Legal, MSNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:34 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/trump-muslim-banprobably-legal [https://perma.cc/5NNU-DNHD] (quoting Lawrence Tribe: “The
Constitution’s ‘bar against declaring an official religion’ would apply to discrimination
against non-citizens.”); Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Director: We Will Defend the
Constitution Against a President Trump, WASH. POST (July 13, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-president-trump-would-threaten-our-constitutionalfreedoms/2016/07/13/42b41048-4876-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html [https://perma
.cc/F22R-MFWW]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump’s Policies Would Be Unconstitutional and
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however, tended to be less sanguine.28 Their skepticism that the Supreme Court
would invalidate these orders was grounded in their awareness of the longstanding
debate about the source of the immigration power and the plenary power doctrine
that had grown from it.
In a federal government of enumerated powers, immigration is an exception:
nowhere does the Constitution explicitly grant the federal government full
immigration authority.29 There are some apparent leads—the Migration and
Importation Clause, for example, which sounds like a fine option but in fact, most
agree, was written with slavery and indentured servitude rather than voluntary
immigration in mind.30 There are some partial sources, such as the Naturalization
Clause, which are generally understood to refer only to the government’s ability to
set rules for the granting of citizenship.31 The War Powers Clause probably includes
the ability to regulate “enemy aliens,”32 but says nothing about the majority of
newcomers who come from friendly nations. The best candidate for the source of an
implied power is the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court relied on the

Will Be Challenged If Adopted, ACLU Says, ABA JOURNAL (July 14, 2016, 10:17 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trumps_policies_would_be_
unconstitutional_and_will_be_challenged_aclu_says [https://perma.cc/GLL6-9BEY].
28. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Trump’s Anti-Muslim Plan Is Awful. And Constitutional., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-isawful-and-constitutional.html [https://perma.cc/AT4V-FX2S]; Melber, Legal Scholar, supra note
27. But see Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely To Be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of
Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org
/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power
[https://perma.cc/27U5-VWG5].
29. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 99 (6th ed. 2015).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). Despite its opening
wording, some scholars believe that the Importation Clause was intended only to relate to
slavery. See, e.g., Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J.
198, 214 (1968). Others see the Clause as having had a broader meaning at the time of its
adoption, reaching white immigrants as well as slaves. See DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND
THE COMMERCE POWER 21 (2006); Bilder, supra note 15, at 784–87.
31. The Naturalization Clause exclusively enables Congress to set the terms on which a
noncitizen can gain citizenship, not temporary or permanent admission short of naturalization,
and has nothing to say about removal. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have Power
. . . To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 940–41 (1983) (locating the immigration power exclusively in the Naturalization Clause
but stating that the resulting power was plenary). In a forthcoming paper, my colleagues
Andrew Kent and Thomas Lee will offer evidence from original debates that Founders saw
Naturalization as encompassing immigration more broadly. See E-mail from Thomas Lee,
Professor, Fordham U. School of Law, to author (Mar. 19, 2017, 13:56 EST) (on file with
author).
32. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (relating the
immigration power to deportation in times of war or “Congressional apprehension of foreign
or internal dangers short of war . . . .”).
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Foreign Commerce Clause to undergird the immigration power for decades in the
1800s.33 But given the lack of an explicit link between the two, the Court was free to
change its mind—and did so as that century drew to a close.
The origin story of judicial deference to the federal political branches over
immigration has been oft-told.34 The Supreme Court articulated the plenary power
doctrine for the first time in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Case).35 The Court declared that the political branches, and particularly Congress,
held the exclusive power to determine who could enter the United States and on what
terms.36 Legislative action regarding the exclusion of newcomers would be subject
to extremely limited judicial review for constitutionality.37 With no clear
constitutional boundaries on the field, the Court established a doctrine for review of
immigration law and policy that stood outside the mandate of Marbury v. Madison
that “a law repugnant to the [C]onstitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.”38
The Chinese Exclusion Case was decided at a time of positive U.S.-China
diplomatic relations, but virulent anti-immigrant sentiment directed at Chinese
people in the United States. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, despite the absence of
hostilities with China, Justice Field develops an extended metaphor of immigrants as
invaders to justify transferring the political branches’ power to manage foreign
affairs during times of war to the control of routine immigration from a friendly
nation during peacetime.
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to

33. See infra Part II.A.
34. Stephen Legomsky was the first to lay out a comprehensive, case-by-case account of
the evolution of the doctrine in his 1987 book, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY. LEGOMSKY,
supra note 15, at 177–219. Legomsky argued that the Supreme Court had constructed the
plenary power doctrine by leaping from the international law principle that countries have the
right to exclude foreigners, to the assertion that U.S. constitutional law assigned the
immigration power exclusively to the political branches of the federal government, and that
the decisions of those branches were immune from judicial review. See id. at 184–87.
35. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
Chae Chan Ping, a twelve-year lawful resident of the United States, was barred from returning
to the United States because he had failed to obtain a re-entry permit—even though the permit
requirement had not been in place at the time of his departure. Id. at 585–86. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, this country’s first (but far from last) effort to bar immigration from a
nation or ethnic group, was the source of this mandate. The Act was not repealed until 1943.
Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943 (Magnuson Act), PL 78-199. Later, the Asian
Exclusion Act, part of the Immigration Act of 1924, banned all immigration from Asian
nations. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). Legomsky traces
the beginning of the plenary power doctrine to the earlier line of cases invalidating state efforts
to regulate immigration, establishing the federal government as the sole authority in that arena.
LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 180–92. For a discussion of those cases, which relied on the
Commerce Clause as the source of the immigration power, see infra Part II.A.
36. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
37. Id. at 609.
38. 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
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attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.
It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come,
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from
vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.39
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace
and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there
are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are
subjects.40
In the phrase that elevated the immigration power out of the ordinary sphere of
checks and balances into the plenary domain, Justice Field declares that the
legislature’s decision about who to exclude from the United States “is conclusive
upon the judiciary.”41
It is not surprising that there is some judicial deference to the political branches
in the context of immigration. Despite predictions to the contrary at the turn of the
twenty-first century, the nation-state remains the foundational unit of governance
around the globe.42 Most people instinctively feel that a sovereign country should
have the right to establish rules about the categories and processes for immigration.
More controversial has been the doctrine’s extent. A number of other government
powers have been labeled “plenary” and yet remain subject to constitutional
constraints.43 Yet the immigration plenary power doctrine has often been deployed
by courts to insulate rules and processes regarding those who seek to enter or remain
in the United States from most of the protections of individual rights that the
Constitution grants in other contexts.44 The irony is acute: a government power
tenuously rooted in the Constitution has been interpreted to grant the political

39. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. But see Cleveland, supra note 15, at 277–84; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 53–56;
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (1993)
(arguing that the sovereignty rationale for a broad plenary power is a relic of the nineteenth
century, and no longer makes sense after the creation of a positive law structure for nations’
obligations in the international realm and the individual rights revolution).
43. For example, the War Powers and the Indian and Foreign Commerce Clauses. For
discussion of the difference between how plenary has been interpreted in the context of the
Foreign Commerce Clause and in the immigration context, see infra notes 199–203.
44. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[T]his Court has firmly and repeatedly
endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable
if applied to citizens.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“‘Over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the
admission of aliens.”) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”).
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branches carte blanche to ignore constitutionally-protected rights with regard to
immigrants and those who associate with them.45
Within a few years of the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court had
elaborated the federal government’s control of immigration as inherent in the rights
of a national government to conduct foreign affairs and establish and defend its
sovereignty.46 In a series of decisions, it extended the plenary power doctrine to the
immigration actions of the executive branch as well as Congress, and (in a weaker
form) to the deportation of noncitizens residing in the United States as well as the
exclusion of those seeking admission.47 It established doctrinal distinctions still
dominant today, for example, that judicial review will usually be more vigorous
where noncitizens have already been admitted to the country rather than standing
(literally or by legal fiction) outside the border,48 and where procedural rather than
substantive rights are at stake.49 These cases set the course for the jurisprudence of

45. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
supra note 2, at 275.
46. “The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
47. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), the Supreme Court extended
the plenary power doctrine to procedures and decisions of the California immigration
commissioner and the (separate) federal inspector for the port of San Francisco, both acting
via grant of authority from the federal Treasury Secretary. Id. at 662–63. This closed off most
avenues to appeal to federal courts by noncitizens denied entry. “[T]he decisions of executive
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due
process of law.” Id. at 660 (emphasis added). Ekiu did, however, preserve the writ of habeas
corpus for noncitizens who were detained by the U.S. government after being excluded. Id.
Note that this extension of the power to both political branches goes beyond the Chinese
Exclusion Case’s initial assignment of plenary power to Congress alone. In Fong Yue Ting,
the Supreme Court extended the plenary power doctrine to noncitizens already admitted to the
country. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893).
The executive branch plays a critical role in regulating immigration. The plenary
power doctrine encompasses both of the political branches, and courts have been unable or
unwilling to clarify where which aspects of the power lie. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009). The Commerce Clause, however, is explicit
in granting the authority over commerce solely to Congress. See infra notes 205–207 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how the executive’s current extensive role in
immigration decision-making and standard-setting is related to the congressional immigration
power as currently understood. A similar understanding would bring the executive branch
under a Commerce Clause-based understanding of the immigration power.
48. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Immigration law uses the legal
fiction of “standing outside the border” to distinguish those who have been legally admitted
from those who have not. A noncitizen is referred to as “standing outside the border” whether
she is in another country applying for a visa, actually at the border requesting admission, or
present in the United States without having been legally admitted.
49. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
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the federal immigration power well into the 1970s, with sporadic reappearances
through the twenty-first century.50
Litigation over the relationship between immigration and the Constitution has
waxed and waned. Immigration all but fell off the federal docket during the
restrictionist 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s, taking the question of plenary power with it.
When the issue returned in 1950, however, the Cold War was underway, and the
plenary power doctrine came back in full force. The Supreme Court’s 1950 statement
in Knauff v. Shaughnessy that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,”51 signaled the renewed

50. At the outset, it is important to clarify that jurisprudence on immigrants and the
Constitution is generally bifurcated. Although the plenary power line of cases, at issue here,
limits judicial review for constitutionality of immigration law and policy, that is as to
noncitizens’ right to enter and remain in the United States, a separate line of cases, dating from
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), grants immigrants—including in many cases
undocumented immigrants—constitutional protections as to many aspects of their daily lives
in the country. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one
of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted). The Court emphasizes, however, that these protections do not
extend to the context of exclusion and deportation.
In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The
exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible
counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own
citizenry.
Id. at 79–80 (footnotes omitted).
So, for example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been held to encompass
the right of noncitizen children, including undocumented children, to a free public education
through secondary school, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and of noncitizens in criminal
proceedings to the same Miranda warning and protection against unconstitutional searches and
seizures enjoyed by citizens, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). For
assessments of the extent of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, see GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996);
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59
DUKE L.J. 1723 passim (2010).
The Supreme Court has, however, permitted Congress to distinguish between legal
permanent residents and citizens in certain other contexts. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971), the Court established that state classifications based on alienage should be subject
to strict scrutiny, id. at 372, but soon carved out an exception where the distinction was tied to
the state’s governmental operations, permitting state discrimination against legal permanent
residents in hiring for policing, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), and for public school
teaching, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), among other arenas. In Mathews v. Diaz,
moreover, the Court made clear that a lower level of scrutiny applied when examining federal
alienage classifications created by Congress. 426 U.S. at 85–87. That case upheld a federal
law requiring five years of continuous residence from legal permanent residents before
qualifying for certain federal public benefits, with no such requirement for citizens. Id. at 87.
51. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
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vigor with which the Court would turn to the doctrine during the decades that
followed.52 National security and foreign affairs rationales were central to decisions
upholding actions on immigration by both the legislative and executive branches as
the Cold War proceeded.53
Others have amply described the impact of the plenary power doctrine over the
past century. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that despite its
tenuous link to an enumerated power, the doctrine has been cited by the Supreme
Court in upholding immigration policies that openly discriminate on the basis of a
noncitizen’s race, gender, national origin, or political views.54 Until 2018, the

52. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (Justice Frankfurter: While “much
could be said for the view” that due process limits congressional power in the immigration
arena “were we writing on a clean slate . . . the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power
of Congress under review, there is not merely ‘a page of history,’ but a whole volume. Policies
pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with
the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive
Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. But that the
formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government.”) (citations omitted).
53. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1972) (citing national security
concerns and the plenary power doctrine in upholding the decision of the Attorney General
not to permit a foreign scholar with Marxist views to enter the United States to attend a
conference); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953) (citing
national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine in upholding as constitutional the
indefinite detention of a legal permanent resident seeking re-admission to the United States);
Knauff, 338 U.S. at 549–50 (citing national security concerns and the plenary power doctrine
in upholding as constitutional the exclusion from the United States without a hearing of the
wife of a United States citizen).
54. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The
controlling opinion in a recent Supreme Court plurality decision also cited plenary power with
approval. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–40 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a
review of modern cases, see Chin, supra note 15, at 3–7; Legomsky, Immigration Law and
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 4, at 261–69. Regarding Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), Chin argues that despite its holding the case actually represents a
“[q]uiet [e]xpansion of [j]udicial [r]eview,” because the Court did not say that there was no
review of Congress’s substantive categories in the immigration context, instead accepting
“limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of
Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens.” Chin, supra note 15, at 62–66
(quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5). However, as Chin notes, the Court upheld Congress’s
differential gender-based standard following “an exceedingly deferential review.” Id. at 64.
This is not by any means to say that noncitizens always lose in cases about
immigration. As Stephen Legomsky observed thirty years ago, in the modern era the Court
has not infrequently turned to liberal statutory interpretation as a way of avoiding the plenary
power doctrine. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15 at 156–70; see also Motomura, supra note 49;
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). Kevin Johnson has
recently argued that the Court increasingly relies on ordinary tools of statutory construction,
including the constitutional avoidance doctrine and clear statement rules, as well as the
application of administrative law principles, to rule in favor of immigrants. See Johnson, supra
note 4 passim.
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Supreme Court had never held unconstitutional a substantive criterion for admission
or “removal” (the modern term that covers both exclusion at the border and
deportation from the interior), whether established by Congress or the executive
branch.55 In addition, the Court has relied on plenary power in permitting procedures
in the immigration arena that would clearly violate the due process protections of the
Constitution if they were applied elsewhere. These include indefinite detention on
the basis of evidence not revealed to the noncitizen;56 removal based on an
administrative hearing held in English at which the noncitizen—whose sole language
was Japanese—was unrepresented, had no translator, and was unaware that the
procedure related to her deportation;57 and indeed the removal of a noncitizen based

Indeed, Supreme Court decisions in 2017 saw a number of immigrants prevail in
challenges to immigration law. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (finding
that attorney’s faulty advice regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal plea led to
prejudice, and ruling for noncitizen); Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017)
(before the government can denaturalize a naturalized citizen on the basis of a conviction for
misstatements on her citizenship application, it must show that the misstatements were central
to the grant of citizenship); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (applying
a categorical approach to the crime of statutory rape for the purposes of immigration law;
holding that for a conviction of statutory rape to qualify as an aggravated felony, the
underlying state law must criminalize sexual intercourse with an individual younger than
sixteen). Consistent with Johnson’s thesis, all of these rulings were made on statutory
interpretation grounds and did not mention plenary power. In the one immigration case where
the Supreme Court resolved a constitutional question, Morales-Santana (discussed infra), it
was careful to distinguish between the context where the constitutional challenge arose, which
it characterized as relating to citizenship at birth, and the context of noncitizen admission
categories in which greater deference is due to Congress. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at
1700–01.
55. The 2018 case striking a removal ground for the first time is Sessions v. Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. 1204 (2018). In Dimaya, the Court held that one part of the definition of “crime of
violence” as a ground for deportation as an “Aggravated Felon” was void for vagueness. Id.
The opinion does not mention the plenary power doctrine.
In addition, in 2017 the Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678
(2017). There, it found that the larger burden that the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes
on unwed U.S. citizen fathers versus mothers in order to pass citizenship to their children was
a violation of Equal Protection. Id. at 1700–01. In so doing, the Court explicitly sidestepped
the question of the vitality of the plenary power doctrine. It distinguished the question
presented as related to a claim of citizenship on birth, rather than an “entry preference for
aliens” that might have triggered the need for maximal judicial deference that plenary power
mandates in considering constitutional challenges to immigration. Id. at 1693.
56. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 206.
57. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Ironically, Yamataya is a case remembered
for acknowledging some procedural rights in the deportation context, because it required a
sliver of opportunity for the immigrant to be heard in administrative proceedings. This
standard was found to be met when Ms. Yamataya, who spoke no English, was granted a
hearing at which she was not provided a translator and did not realize that the proceedings
related to her deportation. Id. at 90. “If the appellant’s want of knowledge of the English
language put her at some disadvantage . . . that was her misfortune, and constitutes no reason,
under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the intervention of the court by habeas
corpus.” Id. at 102.
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on a hearing held in absentia or without any hearing at all.58 When, in the wake of
9/11, the executive branch required that all men from predominately Muslim
countries in the United States on temporary visas register with the government, the
initiative was upheld by every circuit court that considered constitutional challenges
to it.59 As a number of scholars have pointed out, in addition to its consequences for
immigrants, the plenary power doctrine limits citizens’ ability to exercise their
constitutional rights.60
Plenary power has been roundly critiqued by academics and advocates who see it
as an unwarranted exception to baseline constitutional protections, born of an era of
xenophobia and racism.61 As to the source of the power, scholars have particularly
emphasized the weak constitutional soil in which the Court rooted the doctrine when

58. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012) (repealed 1996); Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328,
333 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Another example of a diminished constitutional safeguard in a
deportation hearing, and most significant to the present case, is that an immigration judge may
deport an alien in absentia based on the existing record.”).
59. For a review of these decisions, see CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT PENN STATE’S
DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SECURE
ITS BORDERS 22–23 (2009), http://www.adc.org/fileadmin/ADC/Pdfs/nseerspaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EW86-MBYL]; see also Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security
Law?, supra note 26.
60. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (Justice Scalia for the plurality: a citizen
has no liberty right in being reunited with her noncitizen spouse, and therefore there is no
process due to her that would require notice of why her husband’s visa was denied);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (declining to balance U.S. citizen professors’
asserted First Amendment right to engage with the views of a noncitizen professor whose visa
was denied, against Congress’s plenary power over immigration; requiring that the U.S.
government provide only a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its denial of the visa);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (although the Court there claimed it did carry
out constitutional review on this issue, it did so with extreme deference to Congress, and
ultimately held that citizens’ rights were not infringed). But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2416–17 (2018), where the majority finds that U.S. citizens have standing to challenge
the President’s travel ban because they have a cognizable interest in being reunited with their
relatives, before holding against the plaintiffs on the merits. See also Justice Kennedy’s
controlling concurrence in Kerry v. Din, where he assumes without deciding that U.S. citizens
have a liberty interest in being reunited with a noncitizen spouse or other relatives abroad, but
finds that right not infringed by the U.S. government policy of giving no further information
when a visa is denied on terrorism grounds by a consular authority. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2139
(Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion, see NEUMAN, supra note 50, at 138
(mentioning as examples citizens’ First Amendment rights when denied the opportunity to
hear from and interact with the noncitizen); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line:
Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013).
61. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57. See also LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 69–93
(1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525,
531 (2000). The decision in Trump v. Hawaii has again raised these concerns. See, e.g., Leah
Litman, Opinion, Unchecked Power Is Still Dangerous No Matter What the Court Says, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/travel-ban-hawaiisupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/FN7N-SYY3].
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it turned away from the enumerated powers to foreign affairs and sovereignty
rationales.62
One such critique emphasizes that if the foreign affairs power is to be relied on
across the board as a source of the immigration power, it must be justified by
reference to the centrality of international relations to most immigration decisions
made by the executive and legislative branches.63 Indeed, some small number of
immigration determinations do have the potential to influence the United States’
standing with other nations. A decision to refuse a visa to a foreign official, for
example, or to create additional requirements for entry for citizens of a country with
which the United States is in conflict, may provoke a reaction from the government
of the affected country.64 But today, the vast majority of immigration laws and
procedures, and the decisions made under them, are routine, set out criteria that apply
to nationals of all countries, and at least ostensibly reflect considerations unrelated
to foreign relations, such as the individual’s impact on the public health, her criminal
record, the likelihood she will become a public charge, and whether her presence will
deprive U.S. workers of employment. While relationships with individual nations
may receive outsized attention when they arise in the immigration context, in fact
they affect a miniscule percentage of immigration law and its application.65 Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia has made a similar argument regarding the limited nexus
between genuine national security concerns and most of immigration law.66
More broadly, a number of scholars outside the immigration arena have sought to
undermine the assumption that the political branches’ foreign affairs power itself lies
beyond the realm of constitutional protections.67 Control over foreign affairs is only

62. Note, however, that foreign affairs was already present as an explicit rationale in
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275
(1876). The principle concern about foreign affairs at that time seems to have been that one
state could end up disrupting the country’s relationship with another country. “If it be
otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other
nations.” Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.
63. For variations on this argument see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 160–62 (2002);
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note
4, at 261–69; Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law”, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179
(2016); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 53; NEUMAN, supra note 50, at 135–38; David S. Rubenstein
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 615–16
(2017). But see David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 38–42 (2015) (arguing that the foreign affairs rationale remains a valid
justification for a diminished level of judicial review of immigration policies in some
instances).
64. One example of this is the retaliatory action the Brazilian government took against
U.S. citizens seeking to enter Brazil when the United States refused to allow Brazilians to
enter without a visa. See C.S., You’re Not Welcome, ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/02/tourist-visas [https://perma.cc/XC6W-LC5A].
65. See sources cited supra note 63.
66. Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, supra note 26.
67. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (with responses in the Harvard Law Review Forum by
Carlos Vázquez, Curtis A. Bradley, and Stephen I. Vladeck); see also Abrams, supra note 47,
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implied from the Constitution, rather than explicitly set forth in it.68 Nonetheless,
during the years from the Supreme Court’s 1936 United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.69 decision through the end of the Cold War, the Court interpreted the
power expansively, permitting the executive to use it to insulate a wide range of
actions from meaningful constitutional review. In The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth have recently argued that the
Supreme Court has now entered a new “normalized” phase of construction of the
foreign affairs power, with a turn to more ordinary review.70 When the Court
considers immigration cases, however, this normalization is not evident.
Sovereignty has been separately critiqued as a basis for the immigration power.
Some scholars have questioned the notion of sovereignty as a modern rationale for a
number of government powers, arguing that it is rooted in an outdated nineteenth
century territorial conception of what it means to be a nation-state.71 It is beyond the
scope of this Article to resolve the debate about the contemporary relevance of
sovereignty to immigration policy. Instead, it proceeds on the pragmatic view that
arguments about the demise of sovereignty are unlikely to meet a warm reception in
the federal courts. With that assumption in mind, one response might be to accept the
relationship between sovereignty and immigration, while contesting the exemption
that plenary power grants the government from constitutional constraints. But such
an approach faces an uphill battle, in that its demand for constitutional rights will
always be taken up in the shadow cast by the tradition of deference that accompanies
sovereignty justifications. In response, this Article calls for a doctrinal
counterweight: an additional constitutional source for the immigration power, on
which judges and litigants can draw as a reminder that most immigration laws and
policies have quotidian rather than grand aims, and should receive an ordinary
measure of constitutional review.
With some major exceptions, including Trump v. Hawaii in 2018, in recent years
plenary power has appeared to be in decline.72 A number of Supreme Court decisions
have veered away from applying a plenary power analysis, albeit without overruling
the doctrine. In 2015, Kevin Johnson argued that although the Supreme Court had
announced no move to change the doctrine, in practice it now sought to resolve most

at 635–36. Most recently, in his forthcoming book, Martin Flaherty critiques the idea of
judicial deference to the executive in the realm of foreign affairs as a “newcomer to the legal
landscape,” and argues for a no-deference standard. MARTIN FLAHERTY, THE SUPREME COURT
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the author).
68. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1972).
69. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
70. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 67.
71. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 184–86; Cleveland, supra note 15, at 99–112; Lindsay,
supra note 15.
72. The case most responsible for this theory was Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
decided just a few months before 9/11, in which the Court applied the constitutional avoidance
canon to justify reading a six-month limit into a statutory provision authorizing unlimited
detention of noncitizens who are excludable, removable, or a flight risk. Following 9/11,
however, the door appeared to close. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Nonetheless,
since then, the Court has only occasionally referred to plenary power or cited the Chinese
Exclusion Case and its fellows, even when it has appeared to apply the doctrine.
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immigration cases that raise a combination of constitutional, statutory interpretation,
and administrative law questions by avoiding the constitutional issues, consistent
with the constitutional avoidance canon.73 Instead, it used the ordinary tools of
statutory construction and assessment of the scope of the agency’s exercise of its
discretion to resolve the case.74 He concluded that “[i]mmigration exceptionalism—
and, with it, the Chinese Exclusion Case—after 125 years appears to slowly but
surely be on its way out.”75
Others at the time were less optimistic, pointing to recurring instances since 9/11
when the Supreme Court applied the plenary power doctrine.76 In 2003, the Supreme
Court relied on plenary power to uphold a statute mandating detention for classes of
noncitizens prior to determination of their deportability.77 In 2015, the Supreme
Court upheld a State Department policy of providing minimal explanation to a
noncitizen whose visa application is denied by a consular official in a plurality
opinion in Kerry v. Din,78 with several justices explicitly citing the doctrine.79
In its 2018 decisions on immigration and the Constitution, the Supreme Court did
little to clarify its approach to the plenary power doctrine. Indeed, it deepened the
confusion by ignoring the doctrine in one case while applying it in another, without
making any effort to reconcile its approaches. In Sessions v. Dimaya,80 the Court
acted consistently with the view that plenary power is on the wane by striking down
a substantive deportation ground as void for vagueness, with no reference to a
diminished standard of constitutional review in immigration cases.81 In Trump v.

73. Johnson, supra note 4, at 61–65. See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 156–170;
Motomura, supra note 55; Motomura, supra note 49.
74. Johnson, supra note 4, at 61–65.
75. Id. at 118; see also Lindsay, supra note 63, at 241; Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra
note 63. But see Kevin Johnson, No Decision in Two Immigration Enforcement Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-decisiontwo-immigration-enforcement-cases [https://perma.cc/8Q3M-5HUN] (noting uncertainty
about the direction the Court will take following its 2017 decision to postpone decisions in
two cases challenging the constitutionality of aspects of immigration law).
76. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015) (“A sober observer would point out that
immigration law scholars have been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power
doctrine for at least three decades.” (citing Legomsky, supra note 4, at 305)); Lindsay, supra
note 15, at 8 (“Although the Supreme Court in recent decades has muted some of the more
severe aspects of the plenary power doctrine, the constitutional exceptionalism of the
immigration power, as well as its core legal rationale, remain fundamentally intact.” (footnote
omitted)).
77. Demore, 538 U.S. at 521.
78. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
79. Id. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This case is used as a jumping off point to
argue that the plenary power doctrine is being dismantled as to procedural challenges but
preserved as to substantive constitutional rights. See Kagan, supra note 76. Kagan notes that
although “recent case law has significantly weakened the doctrine,” the Supreme Court “may
be hesitant to discard the doctrine entirely.” Id. at 23.
80. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
81. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
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Hawaii,82 by contrast, the Court applied a minimalist standard of constitutional
review to uphold the President’s travel ban against an Establishment Clause
challenge, citing core plenary power cases with approval.83
The Court may have split the baby in this way because Dimaya dealt with a
provision for the deportation of noncitizens already admitted to the country, a posture
in which plenary power has been weakened, while Hawaii was about measures to
exclude would-be entrants and arose in a context where the government claimed
national security was at stake, two settings where plenary power is at its strongest.84
But the justices themselves offered no such explanation. In light of the 2018
retirement of Justice Kennedy, and the probability that his replacement will cement
a conservative majority on the Court, the plenary power doctrine now seems more
likely to regain prominence than to quietly disappear.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A SOURCE OF THE IMMIGRATION POWER
It has been well over a century since the Supreme Court last held that the federal
immigration power was rooted in the Foreign Commerce Clause. The Interstate
Commerce Clause has never been seriously considered for this role. Yet today, taken
together, they offer an additional framework for the federal immigration power, one
that is directly rooted in the Constitution and that sets the stage for a more robust
standard of judicial review.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”85 Each element of the clause has been interpreted as giving rise to a distinct
form of the power, with its own evolution over time. In addition, a fourth “negative”
or “dormant” Commerce Clause has been derived from this language, rendering a
state or local law as unconstitutional when it unduly burdens interstate commerce.
Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden86 in 1824, the Commerce Clause has been
understood as governing a broad swath of economic activity, although the precise
contours of the commerce power have been interpreted differently over time. This
section briefly traces the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, argues for
locating the immigration power in the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses, and
contends that adoption of this view would facilitate more robust judicial review of
immigration laws and policies for constitutionality.
A. The Lost Source: The Foreign Commerce Clause
From early in the nation’s history, it was understood that the Commerce Clause
permitted the federal government to control certain aspects of immigration—those
that were analogous to international trade in commercial goods—with the states
retaining all other authority under their police powers.87 Underpinning this view of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
See infra note 271.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Id. at 196–97; Abrams, supra note 47, at 611 n.41 (citing NEUMAN, supra note 50, at
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the federal power was the concept that human beings could be characterized as
“articles of commerce,” and therefore that their transportation across national borders
fell under federal purview. This assertion was first made regarding the importation
of slaves and indentured servants in the days after the founding of the United States.88
The initial consensus that people were properly considered articles of commerce
fell apart in the mid-1800s.89 The dispute was not generated by immigration. With
important exceptions, the general attitude in the country in the mid-1800s was proimmigration: even as Irish and Asian immigrants faced rampant xenophobia,90
newcomers were recruited for their labor—if not always made welcome on arrival—
in a growing nation with ample space.91 Instead, it originated with the national
conflict over slavery. If immigrants were articles of commerce, then so too were
slaves—and if so, Congress could ban the domestic slave trade under its Commerce
Clause authority.92 As conflict over slavery between the North and South gained
intensity, southern states and slave owners fought this interpretation. Mary Sarah
Bilder, in her history of this period, notes the profound irony of lawyers for the pro-

138); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 6, 13. For an overview of this question, see Erin F. Delaney,
In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws
Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2007).
88. Bilder, supra note 15, at 761.
89. Id. at 748 (“[T]his assumption—that persons entering from abroad were ‘articles of
commerce’—became one of the most disputed questions of constitutional law.”).
An important question is whether considering people as commerce fundamentally
commodifies human beings, demeaning their dignity, denying their agency, and masking their
noneconomic reasons for migrating. This is especially problematic given that the pre-Chinese
Exclusion Case jurisprudence rooting the immigration power in the Foreign Commerce Clause
and arguing for people as commerce really was about pacifying the South and permitting
southern states to continue denying entrance to free blacks. In focusing on economic concerns,
does this proposal obscure the frankly racist basis of much U.S. immigration policy? See Chin,
supra note 15, at 29 (“Mass immigration . . . was not the problem; Chinese represented a
fraction of total immigration. Moreover, labor competition from white aliens was not
criticized.”). See also quotes from multiple legislators expressing white supremacist views as
a basis for exclusion in this context, for example Chin quotes Senator Teller during the debate
over the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 as saying “‘[t]he Caucasian race has a right,
considering its superiority of intellectual force and mental vigor, to look down upon every
other branch of the human family. . . . We are superior to the Chinese.’” Id. at 31.
I take these questions seriously. Yet on balance, I have concluded that, even given
that terrible history, locating the immigration power in the Commerce Clause is a better fit and
reflects more respect for immigrant dignity and agency than the current rooting of the power
in foreign affairs and national security, which implicitly or explicitly sees every immigrant
through a lens of “enemy alien,” invasion, and terrorist threat.
90. Chin, supra note 15, at 20; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 12–13.
91. TONY ALLEN FREYER, THE PASSENGER CASES AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
IMMIGRANTS, BLACKS, AND STATES’ RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 109–110 (2014);
Lindsay, supra note 15, at 11.
92. One example of such an argument can be seen in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449
(1841), a case regarding the validity of Mississippi constitution’s prohibition on the
importation of slaves. As Bilder points out, although the Supreme Court avoided explicit
decision about whether slaves were articles of commerce, the case was “argued as a case about
commerce.” Bilder, supra note 15, at 808.
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slavery camp accusing abolitionists of demeaning slaves as “chattels” by
categorizing them as articles of commerce.93
As it navigated this conflict, the Supreme Court continued to assert the federal
government’s power over the transportation of immigrants as a function of the
Commerce Clause. For the bulk of the nineteenth century, most efforts to regulate
immigration occurred on a state level, and were limited to weeding out those seen as
criminal, sick, or unable to support themselves—or to funding their care—rather than
to reducing immigration numbers as a whole.94 The regulated parties generally were
not individual immigrants, but the merchants who brought them into the country.95
Most of these state initiatives efforts sought to impose per-passenger fees and
reporting requirements on ships arriving from overseas and docking at a port in the
state.
In the cases that arose from challenges to these policies, the Supreme Court made
clear that it saw the foreign commerce power as the explicit source of the federal
government’s authority over the transportation of immigrants.96 The seaboard states
justified their head taxes and related reporting requirements as a way to assess the
needs of newcomers and to pay for their care and support.97 Shipmasters argued that
the states’ actions represented efforts to control foreign commerce, a power which
lay exclusively with the federal government.98 The Supreme Court sometimes
rejected these Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, as it did in Miln in 1837,
permitting New York’s reporting requirement to stand as an exercise of the state’s
police power.99 It sometimes upheld them, as with the 1849 Passenger Cases, where
the Court struck down New York and Massachusetts head tax laws as
unconstitutional because they usurped the federal commerce power.100 Either way,
what the justices debated was the distribution of power over immigration between
the states under their police powers and the federal government under its foreign
commerce power. Despite debate among the justices, shifting majorities consistently
reached the conclusion that the federal authority over immigration derived from the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
When the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court left behind any hesitation about
explicitly rooting the federal government’s immigration power in the Foreign
Commerce Clause.101 After Congress passed an 1875 immigration statute, one of its

93. The attorney for Mississippi argued that slaves were persons not commerce and
decried abolitionists who would reduce them to “chattels.” The opposing anti-slavery
attorneys were forced to argue that slaves are articles of commerce in order to gain federal
regulation. Bilder, supra note 15, at 807–09.
94. See Lindsay, supra note 15, at 13.
95. “Consistent with the belief that immigration involved a commerce, regulation did not
focus on the people entering, but on the merchants who imported them.” Bilder, supra note
15, at 772.
96. Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Mayor of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. 102 (1837); FREYER, supra note 91, at 73; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 13, 19.
97. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 284; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 17.
98. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 288; Miln, 36 U.S. at 107.
99. 36 U.S. at 102.
100. 48 U.S. at 283.
101. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92
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earliest efforts to regulate immigration on a national level, the Supreme Court struck
down New York, California, and Louisiana statutes regulating shipmasters bringing
newcomers to those seaboard states under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis that
reiterated the Foreign Commerce Clause as the source of an exclusive federal
authority over the transportation of immigrants.102 In Henderson v. Mayor of New
York,103 the Supreme Court explicitly held that immigration was commerce with
foreign nations.104 In Chy Lung v. Freeman,105 the Court invalidated a California law
limiting and taxing immigration to the state, arguing that
[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to
the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations:
the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the
manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government.”106

U.S. 275 (1876). See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) for discussion of how
almost all Commerce Clause cases were Dormant Commerce Clause cases until 1887. For the
importance of the distinction between the federalism cases and the immigrants’ rights cases,
see Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 63.
“Only after the Reconstruction Amendments formally barred people from actually
being held as potential articles of commerce under slavery or involuntary servitude could the
Court accept that immigrants were ‘articles of commerce.’” Bilder, supra note 15, at 823.
102. 92 U.S. at 259.
103. Id.
104. The Henderson Court states that during the time passed since the holding in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), that navigation was commerce.
[T]he transportation of passengers from European ports to those of the United
States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that
time to other branches of commerce. It has become a part of our commerce with
foreign nations, of vast interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who
come among us to find a welcome and a home within our borders. In addition to
the wealth which some of them bring, they bring still more largely the labor
which we need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent resources
of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and its agriculture. Is the
regulation of this great system a regulation of commerce? Can it be doubted that
a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels shall engage in it is a law
regulating this branch of commerce?
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270–71. Answering this rhetorical question in the affirmative: “A law
or a rule emanating from any lawful authority, which prescribes terms or conditions on which
alone the vessel can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of
vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign
nations.” Id. at 271.
105. 92 U.S. 275.
106. Id. at 280. As the last sentence quoted in the text indicates, the Court emphasizes the
political rather than economic implications of permitting states to regulate immigration, akin
more to the foreign affairs power that the Court would later cite in the Chinese Exclusion Case
than to the Commerce Clause.
If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign
nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon
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Undergirding this conclusion was the understanding that the transportation of
immigrants to the United States was foreign commerce of great economic importance
to the country.107 Congress’s immigration power grew from the right to regulate such
commerce, as well as its power over foreign affairs.108
All of these cases were challenges to state action in the immigration arena. It was
not until 1884 that the Supreme Court was called upon to affirmatively rule on a
challenge to the federal immigration power, again in the context of a law imposing
taxes and other responsibilities on shipmasters. In the Head Money Cases,109 which
involved a challenge to the federal Immigration Act of 1882,110 taxing the
transporters of immigrants at fifty cents per head, the Court unanimously upheld the
law on the grounds that it was a valid exercise of the government’s immigration
authority, explicitly granted by the Foreign Commerce Clause.111 In support of its

herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as
to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the
general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it
does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?
Id. Kerry Abrams traces the relationship between these cases and the contemporary Supreme
Court decisions on whether state legislation regarding immigrants are preempted by the federal
immigration power. Abrams, supra note 47.
107. See Lindsay, supra note 15, at 23. The transportation of European immigrants to the
United States has “attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that time
to other branches of commerce.” Id. at 24 (quoting Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270). The reference
is to when Gibbons was decided about fifty years earlier, declaring that laws on navigation
constituted regulation of foreign commerce. See id. “In addition to the wealth which some of
[the European immigrants] bring, they bring still more largely the labor which we need to till
our soil, build our railroads and develop the latent resources of the country.” Id. at 25 (quoting
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270).
108. Regarding foreign affairs, see id. at 24–25 (quoting Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273).
But as Mary Sarah Bilder and others have argued, for the Supreme Court to hold that the
Commerce Clause covered the movement of human beings as well as goods across borders
was complicated by far more than definitional issues. See Bilder, supra note 15.
109. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
110. The Act taxed the arrival of noncitizens at a U.S. port at fifty cents a head, declaring
that
[t]he money thus collected shall be paid into the United States Treasury, and shall
constitute a fund to be called the immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the expense of regulating
immigration under this act, and for the care of immigrants arriving in the United
States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes and
expenses of carrying this act into effect.
Id. at 589–90 (citing the Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (1882)).
111. Id. at 591 (“We are now asked to decide that [the immigration power] does not exist
in Congress, which is to hold that it does not exist at all—that the framers of the Constitution
have so worded that remarkable instrument, that the ships of all nations, including our own,
can, without restraint or regulation, deposit here, if they find it to their interest to do so, the
entire European population of criminals, paupers, and diseased persons, without making any
provision to preserve them from starvation, and its concomitant sufferings, even for the first
few days after they have left the vessel.”). See also Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 719;
Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57.
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finding that the immigration “power does reside in Congress, [and] is conferred upon
that body by the express language of the Constitution,”112 the Court cited its Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis in the earlier state immigration law cases.113 The opinion
states that immigration laws “are regulations of commerce—of commerce with
foreign nations,” and they “constitute a regulation of that class which belongs
exclusively to Congress . . . .”114 If the federal immigration power is rooted in the
Commerce Clause for the purposes of preempting state action, the Court reasoned,
that same source grants the federal government the sole power to regulate
affirmatively in the field.115 The Head Money Cases are not remembered for this
holding, which was uncontroversial at the time. Instead, they are recalled as striking
a new balance between state and federal control over immigration, one that strongly
favored the federal government.116
The course of immigration jurisprudence changed only five years later, however,
when a Court with just two new members took an uncharted path.117 In the Chinese
Exclusion Case, a case about individual constitutional rights rather than immigration
federalism, Justice Field’s opinion for a unanimous Court sets out the plenary power
doctrine described in Part II, rooting immigration not in the Commerce Clause but in
the nation’s sovereignty and authority over its foreign affairs.118 In his entire Chinese
Exclusion Case opinion, Justice Field cites the Head Money Cases but one time, and
for an aspect of the holding unrelated to the source of the immigration power.119 The

112. Head Money Cases, 122 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 591–93.
114. Id. at 591, 595 (“[T]he power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The
burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of
commerce—of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration.”).
115. Most recently, the Dormant Commerce Clause has been raised in the context of
challenges to state efforts to limit the rights of immigrants in Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia,
among other states, in the first decade of the 2000s. For a discussion of the blurring of lines
between the plenary power doctrine and immigration preemption, see Abrams, supra note 47,
at 617–18.
116. See FREYER, supra note 91, at 144–45; Lindsay, supra note 15, at 28. Note that the
debate had important implications for the parallel debate about slavery and state versus federal
power in that context. FREYER, supra note 91, at 56.
117. Between the Head Money Cases and the Chinese Exclusion Case, Chief Justice
Morrison Waite and Associate Justice William Woods left the Court and were replaced by
Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Associate Justice Lucius Lamar II. The seven associate
justices who remained on the Court during this period joined the unanimous opinions in both
cases.
While the view I present here—that the emergence of the plenary power doctrine
represented a break with past jurisprudence, reflecting and motivated by a rise in anti-Chinese
sentiment—is widely shared, it is not without dissenters. See, e.g., E-mail from Thomas Lee,
supra note 31.
118. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
119.
The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately
considered in The Head Money Cases, and it was there adjudged “that so far as
a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject
of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as
Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”
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Foreign Commerce Clause also appears only once in the opinion, as part of a grabbag list of federal powers relevant to relations with other countries.120 Interstate
commerce is mentioned a single time, in a similarly broad recital of aspects of
internal governance.121 Neither is claimed as a source for plenary power.
Justice Field offers no explanation for the Court’s abandonment of the Commerce
Clause as the primary source of the immigration power, and few commentators have
explored the question. One exception is Matthew Lindsay, who has argued that the
shift came about due to transformations taking place in the U.S. political economy
and in perceptions of immigration at the time.122 He contends that the motivation had
little to do with changing interpretations of the Constitution; rather, “the plenary
power doctrine was borne of an urgent sense of national peril”123 which recast the
arrival of newcomers as a foreign invasion rather than an economic benefit, and that

Id. at 600 (quoting the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).
120. Id. at 604 (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit
subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise
only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control,
more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 605 (“It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and
sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require
uniformity of regulations and laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies,
the postal system, patent and copyright laws, the public lands and interstate commerce, all
which subjects are expressly or impliedly prohibited to the state governments.”) (emphasis
added).
122. Lindsay, supra note 15. My colleague, Tom Lee, suggests that the shift may, instead,
have been due to the fact that the Chinese Exclusion Acts represented the first affirmative
federal immigration statutes to exclude a group of people based on nationality or race, since
prior immigration was principally from Europe and regulated by treaty and state taxes on
persons transported as in the Head Money Cases. Because the Chinese Exclusion Case was
the first time the Court faced this new question, and because—as he and my colleague Andrew
Kent argue in a forthcoming article—plenary power was “part of the original DNA” of the
Constitution, Lee argues that the Court’s initiation of the plenary power doctrine did not
represent a change of course, but rather the first exercise of a dormant but inherent sovereign
power to exclude entry to territory long recognized under the law of nations. E-mail from
Thomas Lee, supra note 31.
123. Lindsay, supra note 15, at 6 (Lindsay goes on to point out “most contemporary
policymakers, judges, and scholars would reject” the terms on which the sense of peril was
based); see also id. at 621–22 (arguing that the rise of modern immigration exceptionalism
lies “more fundamentally in an urgent and pervasive discourse of national self-preservation
that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.”). This is key to his payoff, which is that
the slate of plenary power is not clean:
[T]he ‘slate’ of the American immigration power is in fact a palimpsest of
anachronisms: alien invasions, existential threats to the republic, and simple
racism. If the plenary power doctrine is going to survive into the future . . . it
should at the very least be on grounds that today’s policymakers and judges
recognize as legitimate and intellectually coherent.
Id. at 646.
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the Supreme Court unleashed the plenary power doctrine in order to free the political
branches to defend against it.124
Many scholars have argued that racism and xenophobia were a driving force
behind the Supreme Court’s shift in doctrine.125 This Article posits that another factor
was working in tandem. Both state and federal immigration legislation prior to the
Chinese Exclusion Act governed the transportation entities that brought immigrants
to the United States, rather than regulating immigrants individually.126 This fit
squarely within the Court’s understanding of foreign commerce as related to trade
and navigation. The Chinese Exclusion Act broke with this tradition by directly
restricting the immigration rights of individuals of a particular country, without
reference to intermediaries. Although the opinion gives no hint as to why the Court
moved away from the traditional Foreign Commerce Clause grounding of the
immigration power, some of the impetus may have come from this new approach in
the Act. Since the challenged statute represented the first time that Congress had
directly sought to exclude a particular racial or ethnic group, the Court was free (and
perhaps felt obliged) to find a different basis in the Constitution for this aspect of the
federal immigration authority.
Despite its turn away from commerce, the Chinese Exclusion Case evidences a
strong concern about the economic impact of immigration. Even as Justice Field cuts
the immigration power free from the Commerce Clause, he identifies the problem at
the core of Chinese immigration as a domestic economic one rather than an issue of
politics or foreign relations. He states that Chinese people in the United States
were generally industrious and frugal. Not being accompanied by
families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and they
were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our
laborers and artisans. The competition between them and our people was
for this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation,
proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many cases, by open
conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public peace. The differences of
race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.127
It was this particularly toxic combination of racism and competition for jobs that set
the table for the announcement of the plenary power doctrine.
Following the Chinese Exclusion Case and its companions, the Supreme Court
sometimes mentioned the Foreign Commerce Clause in passing as a kind of backup
for the plenary power doctrine, either alone or among other possible sources for the
immigration power. But with one exception, none of these subsequent holdings
ultimately relied on the Foreign Commerce Clause as the source of the federal

124. Id. at 596, 621.
125. Chin, supra note 15; see sources cited supra note 61.
126. Note that the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 did purport to regulate the immigration
rights of individual noncitizens, but were never enforced and—with the exception of the Alien
Enemies Act (now codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2012))—were allowed to expire within
three years of their passage. J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1402, 1406–07 (1992).
127. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
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immigration power. Instead, they cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny,
with their emphasis on sovereignty and foreign affairs, as the source of the plenary
power doctrine.
That single outlier, Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,128 provides
strong support for the theory advanced here that the Court’s shift from the Commerce
Clause to the plenary power doctrine in the Chinese Exclusion Case came about in
part because the Commerce Clause at the time was seen to allow the federal
government to govern the commercial transportation of immigrants, but not the right
of individual immigrants to enter and remain. The one time that congressional action
after the Chinese Exclusion Case led to a Supreme Court challenge by a shipping
company, rather than an individual, the Court reverted to its earlier Commerce
Clause theory.
In 1903, Congress passed the Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the
United States.129 Responding to growing concern about the role of anarchists in the
United States and the recent assassination of President McKinley, the Act created
new categories of deportable and excludable noncitizens and penalized shipmasters
for bringing noncitizens to the United States who were ineligible to enter.130 The
Act’s constitutionality was twice challenged before the Supreme Court. First, in
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, an anarchist found deportable under the Act
asserted that its provisions were invalid because it infringed on his free speech and
due process rights.131 The Court’s refusal to consider whether the immigration law
violated the Constitution was by then unsurprising. In rejecting Turner’s individual
claims, the Court hedged its bets. It cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and subsequent
plenary power holdings, relying on sovereignty rationale, but also “the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes the entrance of ships, the
importation of goods, and the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States,”
in concluding that “the act before us is not open to constitutional objection.”132
Five years later, the same law was challenged by the Oceanic Steam Navigation
Company, which had been fined under the law for passengers who arrived with
contagious diseases that barred them from entry. The company contended that such
a penalty was beyond Congress’s powers to impose under the Constitution. In
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the Court rejected the navigation firm’s
arguments without ever citing the Chinese Exclusion Case and later plenary power
decisions, or so much as mentioning the foreign affairs or national sovereignty
rationales that for the prior two decades had undergirded the strong version of
Congress’s plenary immigration power.133 Instead, faced with a case about the
transportation of immigrants, it turned back to the Foreign Commerce Clause.134 The

128. 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
129. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
130. Id. §§ 2, 4.
131. See 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
132. Id. at 290.
133. See Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. 320. For an insightful discussion of Oceanic Steam’s
reliance on the Federal Commerce Clause as the source of the immigration power, and of the
relationship of the case to the plenary power doctrine, see Augustine-Adams, supra note 15,
720–21.
134. Several cases in lower or administrative courts in the years following Oceanic Steam
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opinion characterized immigration as functionally the same as trade: the Act’s
validity rested on the assertion that:
no individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations, which is so
broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to
determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this
country and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised.135
Relying on this authority, the Court upheld the Act despite its admission that in
another field its provisions might raise troubling constitutional issues.136 The most
quoted line of the Oceanic Steam opinion states that “over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” immigration.137 In
so holding, the Court imported the new assumption of plenary power into the old line
of cases based on the Commerce Clause.138
In one sense, Oceanic Steam offers hope for the argument advanced here, because
it points to the continued viability of the Foreign Commerce Clause as a basis for the
immigration power. But it also signals its potential limitations. If the relationship
between the Commerce Clause and the federal immigration authority requires the
regulation of a commercial transportation entity, then this would pose a serious
obstacle to the argument that federal statutes establishing the terms on which

reiterated the tie between foreign commerce and the immigration power, without relying on
the statement in upholding a congressional act regarding immigration. Such cases generally
did not cite the Chinese Exclusion Case, referring instead exclusively to prior holdings that
the immigration power was rooted in the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. App. 350, 374 (1927), aff’d, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding
Congress’s imposition of a flexible tariff on foreign nations: “In Henderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259, and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 344 (1909),
the regulation of foreign immigration was held to be within the congressional power to
regulate commerce.”).
135. Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 335.
136. See id. at 338. The Act barred the entry into the United States of foreigners with
contagious diseases, and imposed on each shipmaster the duty to inspect the health of his
passengers and provide a report to the immigration inspection officer at the port of docking.
Immigration Act of 1903 § 12.
137. Id. at 339.
As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States
embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject . . . it follows that the
constitutional right of Congress to enact such legislation is the sole measure by
which its validity is to be determined by the courts.
Id. at 340.
In effect, all the contentions pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of
the statute to the due process clause really disregarded the complete and absolute
power of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals. . . . These
conclusions are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of Congress as to the
admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose the
penalty . . . .
Id. at 343.
138. Like the Chinese Exclusion Case, the opinion refers to the immigration power as
“plenary.” Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 343.
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individuals may enter and remain in the United States (rather than those targeting
transportation entities) are authorized by the Foreign Commerce Clause. Of equal
concern is the standard of review. If the Court in Oceanic Steam could ground
Congress’s immigration authority in the Foreign Commerce Clause and yet describe
it as virtually unlimited, perhaps the Clause provides as little protection from
legislative overreaching as do foreign affairs and national sovereignty.139
The Article addresses both of these concerns below, noting in Part II.B that the
Commerce Clause now is understood to encompass individuals moving across
foreign and interstate borders, not just those who transport them, and arguing in Part
III.B that the understanding of Foreign Commerce Clause plenary power has been
limited so that it does permit meaningful judicial review. Meanwhile, the Interstate
Commerce Clause offers an additional response to both challenges. During the New
Deal, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the requirement that an activity involve
actual transportation across state lines in order to fall within the ambit of the
Interstate Commerce Clause. And the Interstate Commerce Clause has never been
held to immunize congressional action from constitutional review. What, then, of the
relationship between immigration and the Interstate Commerce Clause?
B. A New Source: The Interstate Commerce Clause
It is not surprising that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century courts gave no
serious consideration to the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the
immigration power.140 The interpretation of interstate commerce that held sway at
the time was a limited one. Through the 1800s, interstate commerce was understood
in constrained terms, as principally justifying Congress’s regulation of the
transportation of goods between states for the purpose of sale. Several Supreme
Court cases at the end of that century narrowed the understanding of the Interstate
Commerce Clause further.141 During the New Deal, however, one case on domestic
labor migration and a cluster of others on the scope of federal regulation authorized
by the Interstate Commerce Clause opened the door to the argument that internal
migration is within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.
The Modern Jurisprudence of the Interstate Commerce Clause
In 1941, the Supreme Court in Edwards v. California stated with confidence that
it was “settled beyond question” that the transportation of persons between states was

139. See discussion of this question infra Part III.B. On the other hand, Oceanic Steam is
a muddled case. Without mentioning plenary power or the cases that established it, it grafts
the blanket exception from judicial review that was only justified by plenary power’s reference
to sovereignty and foreign affairs onto the Commerce Clause, which had not previously been
deployed to justify a carve out from ordinary standards of constitutional review.
140. But note that in the context of slavery, there was serious debate about whether
interstate commerce included the movement of slaves across state borders. See LIGHTNER,
supra note 30; see also Bilder, supra note 15.
141. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that
manufacturing is not interstate commerce).
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interstate commerce.142 This assertion rested on the affirmative resolution of the
Supreme Court debate outlined above over whether people could be commerce in the
context of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Like the early Foreign Commerce Clause
immigration cases, Edwards—which challenged California’s prosecution of a man
for driving his unemployed brother-in-law into the state—was about whether
Congress could regulate the act of moving others across state or national borders.143
This is consistent with early understandings of commerce as related to trade,
navigation, or transportation. To be relevant to the regulation of immigrants
themselves, rather than only to the intermediaries who transported them, however,
the Court had to reject this literal understanding of interstate commerce.144
It was not until the New Deal that the Supreme Court made plain that actual
transportation of persons or articles of commerce across borders was not necessary
for an economic activity to be covered by the Commerce Clause.145 To be sure, a few
cases in the early 1900s had hinted at this possibility.146 But at the same time that it
made these limited exceptions, the Court continued to reject efforts by Congress to
set standards for commercial activity such as mining and manufacturing on the
grounds that the standards would be applied to work that took place in a local area
rather than to the movement of products between states.147
The Supreme Court decisively severed its definition of interstate commerce from
literal interstate transportation of goods or people in a series of cases in the 1940s.

142. 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (essentially
stating the same thing in 1824).
143. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160.
144. Ilya Somin states “[t]he Commerce Clause also gives Congress the power to regulate
interstate as well as international commerce. Yet almost no one at the time of the Founding
believed that Congress therefore had the power to forbid Americans from moving from one
state to another.” Ilya Somin, Yes, Obama’s Executive Action Deferring Deportation for
Millions
of
Immigrants
Is
Constitutional,
REASON
(Apr.
19,
2016),
http://reason.com/archives/2016/04/19/yes-obamas-executive-action-deferring-de
[https://perma.cc/2H2U-KN96]. But Annie Chan notes, with reference to Chy Lung and the
Head Money Cases, “[f]inding immigration power within Congress’ foreign commerce power
dovetailed with the view at the time that domestic commerce power encompassed authority
over the migration of persons across state lines.” Annie M. Chan, Community and the
Constitution: A Re-Assessment of the Roots of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 491, 535
(1996) (citing Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1603 (1959)).
145. But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (indicating that the Commerce
Clause was understood as very broad from the beginning: “At the beginning Chief Justice
Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. He made
emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective
restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes.”
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
146. See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375 (1905) (holding that Congress properly drew on its interstate commerce authority when it
permitted regulation of the local meat market under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because local
business can affect the interstate movement of goods and services).
147. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (manufacturing is not
“commerce”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal mining is not
“commerce”).
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United States v. Darby, which upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, represented an
important step in this direction.148 The Act established a national minimum wage, as
well as other workplace protections, and prohibited the shipment across state borders
of goods produced in violation of the Act.149 As to the part of the Act related to
transportation, the Court’s holding was relatively uncontroversial. “While
manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce,” the Court held, “the shipment of
manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such
shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”150 Where Darby
broke new ground was by holding that federal regulation under the Commerce Clause
could set nation-wide standards for the conditions of production. Noting that the lack
of a federal minimum wage allows firms in states with low pay and poor working
standards to compete unfairly with firms in other states that hold employers to a
higher standard, the Court held that Congress also had the power to “regulate
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”151
This “substantial effect” test marked the outer limits of Interstate Commerce Clause
doctrine to that point in the nation’s history.
A year later, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine further, holding that an
impact on interstate commerce could be demonstrated via aggregate noncommercial
activity. In Wickard v. Filburn, Ohio farmer Filburn challenged a federal regulation
that required him to pay a penalty for the amount of wheat he grew in excess of the
allotment given to him by the federal government, even though he raised it in part
for his own use on the farm.152 Filburn contended that a limit on a farmer’s production

148. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
149. Id. at 100.
150. Id. at 113. In so holding, the Court defined interstate commerce to
embrace[] at least the case where an employer engaged . . . in the manufacture
and shipment of goods in filling orders of extrastate customers, manufactures his
product with the intent or expectation that according to the normal course of his
business all or some part of it will be selected for shipment to those customers.
Id. at 117.
151. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective
the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should
not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced
under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the
commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows. The motive
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and
over which the courts are given no control. . . . . Whatever their motive and
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause.
Id. at 115.
152. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The allotment was calculated under the 1938 Agricultural
Adjustment Act; the penalty in question was imposed by a 1941 amendment to the Act. See
id. at 113.
The Act explicitly regulated not only wheat produced for sale, but that intended to
feed animals that would then be sold or otherwise exchanged. Id. at 118–19 (citing the Act).
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for his use alone could not be justified as flowing from the constitutional clause
authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce.153 The Court was not
persuaded. Although any individual’s wheat grown for home use might have a
minimal impact on commerce, it held, in aggregate with many others the effect could
be substantial.154 In the wake of Wickard, conservative justices and commentators in
particular have expressed the concern that if the aggregation of private noneconomic
activity can meet the standard for “affecting interstate commerce,” Congress could
regulate almost anything—including “quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck
suppers throughout the 50 States,”155 in the words of Justice Clarence Thomas—
under its commerce power.156

Mr. Filburn’s principal business seems to have been the sale of milk, poultry, and eggs from
his own cows and chickens, but he also grew a relatively small amount of wheat, some of
which he sold and some of which he used as seed for the next crop, animal feed, and the
making of flour for his family. Id. at 114. “The intended disposition of the crop here involved
has not been expressly stated.” Id. The challenge was based on the (unstated) portion of the
crop intended for consumption on Filburn’s farm, not the part intended for sale.
153. See id. at 119. The farmer’s case raised a question beyond that answered in Darby,
because the Act “extend[ed] federal regulation to production not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Id. at 118. The case also challenged the
Act on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, which were discussed and dismissed elsewhere
in the opinion. See id. at 129–31.
154. See id. at 128. A farmer could use his own wheat to “forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs.” Id. at 127. In other words, “[h]ome-grown wheat . . .
competes with wheat in commerce.” Id. at 128. Taken in total, the Court argued, “[i]t can
hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.” Id.
This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the
market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check
price increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of
the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the
open market.
Id. “[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce . . . .” Id. at 125.
155. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 69 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas’s dissent
is in line with calls from conservative commentators who have decried the broad scope of
federal power permitted by the New Deal cases. See, e.g., David Forte, Commerce, Commerce,
Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of the Commerce Clause, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 18,
2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/commerce-commerce-everywherethe-uses-and-abuses-of-the-commerce-clause
[https://perma.cc/WBC5-KJGG]
(urging
Congress to join the Supreme Court in reining in the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause).
156. One additional development in the 1960s is worth note. In Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964), commonly known as the “Ollie’s Barbecue” case, the Supreme Court
faced a private restaurant that openly discriminated against African Americans. Such
discrimination in privately-owned public accommodation had been barred in 1964 by
Congress through Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 294. The Court upheld the Act against
the restaurant’s challenge, making clear that it saw the protection of human dignity in
commerce as part of Congress’s constitutional mandate, even without considering the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In support of this view, Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Heart
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Within the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has retrenched somewhat on the
scope of the authority granted to the federal government through the Interstate
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that an attempt by
Congress to ban the possession of guns in school zones exceeded congressional
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause,157 reining in the commerce power for
the first time since the New Deal. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
distinguished the law at issue, a criminal statute, from Congress’s restrictions on
home-grown wheat at issue in Wickard. He characterizes Wickard as “perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,”
but states that it still “involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a
gun in a school zone does not.”158
In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist offers three options for congressional action that
could be authorized by the Interstate Commerce Clause: regulation of “the use of the
channels of interstate commerce,”159 “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce,”160 or, finally, “activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.”161 The law at issue in Lopez fell only in the
third category. Although the briefs and dissenting justices presented empirical
evidence of the aggregate impact of guns in school zones on educational opportunity,
arguing that the damage to the national economy and productivity was substantial,162
Justice Rehnquist dismisses those arguments as too attenuated.163 He identifies the
target of the regulation as noneconomic, noncommercial, purely criminal activity.164
If aggregation of this sort activates Congress’s power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause, he states, “it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign.”165 The regulation of firearms on school grounds,
he concludes, does not meet the test.166

of Atlanta noted that
[t]he Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental
object of Title II was to vindicate “the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” At the same time,
however, it noted that such an objective has been and could be readily achieved
“by congressional action based on the commerce power of the Constitution.”
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (citing S. REP. NO. 88872, at 16–17 (1964)). See also Justice Goldberg’s concurrence, linking Congress’s authority
under the Interstate Commerce Clause to the power to pass a statute affecting “the vindication
of human dignity and not mere economics.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291
(Goldberg, J., concurring). His concurrence also applied to Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964), with which Heart of Atlanta Motel was consolidated.
157. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
158. Id. at 560.
159. Id. at 558.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 559.
162. Id. at 563–64.
163. Id. at 563–67.
164. Id. at 560, 567.
165. Id. at 564.
166. Id. at 561.
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Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court used a similar rationale
to strike down a private right of action for domestic violence under the Violence
Against Women Act.167 Again, in Morrison, the parties and dissents presented
statistics demonstrating the impact on the national economy from violent attacks on
women, seeking to demonstrate a substantial effect on commerce.168 Again, Justice
Rehnquist held that noneconomic activities such as violence against a particular
group could not be aggregated to reach a level of impact on interstate commerce that
justified Congress’s intervention.169 Justice Rehnquist particularly emphasized the
need to be vigilant about the reach of the Commerce Clause in order to avoid the
federal government encroaching on the traditional spheres of state autonomy.170
In Gonzalez v. Raich, however, the Court returned to the Wickard standard
permitting aggregation of economic activity—including activity that on its face was
private and noncommercial.171 In Raich, a case about medical marijuana, the question
was whether Congress’s Controlled Substances Act, which criminalized the
possession of marijuana, could override California’s statute permitting the seriously
ill to grow and use marijuana pursuant to a valid prescription.172 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens approvingly cited Wickard’s holding that “‘even if
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce.’”173 Reasoning that the local use had a meaningful
effect on the interstate commercial market for marijuana, the Court noted that an
individual marijuana patch was much like wheat grown for personal use.174 It rejected
the argument that medical marijuana fell outside the national market for the drug.
“We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When
Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national
market, it may regulate the entire class.”175 The situation fell within Congress’s
power to regulate local “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”176
The Court emphasized, however, that its decision to permit the Controlled
Substances Act to override California’s regulation of medical marijuana rested in
part on the extensiveness and coherence of the federal regulatory scheme.177

167. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
168. See id. at 631–34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 617.
170. Id. at 644.
171. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
172. Id. at 1.
173. Id. at 17 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
176. Id. The Court has since held that all aspects of drug dealing affect the Interstate
Commerce Clause. See Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2016).
177. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26–27 (“[T]he subdivided class of activities defined by the Court
of Appeals [that is, medical marijuana, the part that plaintiffs argued was not related to
commerce] was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”).
One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide
exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated
for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and
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III. THE ARGUMENT FOR ROOTING THE IMMIGRATION POWER IN THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE TODAY
A. Immigration as an Economic Activity
Most immigration to the United States is economic in motivation and impact. The
majority of immigrants come to the United States in search of better economic
opportunities, and their presence is felt in local, state, and national job markets. In
2015, there were twenty-six million immigrants in the United States labor force,
representing 16.7% of all workers in the country.178 This is the highest percentage of
foreign-born individuals in the workforce since the U.S. Census Bureau began
collecting such data.179 In certain industries, the percentage is even higher. Twentyeight percent of construction workers,180 31% of accommodation workers,181 and
71% of crop workers are foreign-born.182 In particular localities and occupations,

family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
extraordinarily popular substance.
Id. at 28.
No discussion of contemporary Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
complete without mention of Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012),
regarding the lawfulness of the Affordable Care Act, in which a majority of Justices agreed
that the individual health insurance mandate of that Act was invalid because the Commerce
Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate economic inactivity. The Article does not focus
here on Sebelius because it is less relevant for the Article’s argument than Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich.
178. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 19.
179. Daniel White, Foreign-Born Workforce at Two Decade High, TIME (May 20, 2016),
http://time.com/4343274/foreign-born-labor-data-2015 [https://perma.cc/5K35-CZWF]. In
1970, immigrants made up 5% of the population and 5% of the labor force; by 2010 they were
13% of the population and 16% of the labor force. See P’SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON.,
IMMIGRANT
WORKERS
IN
THE
U.S.
LABOR
FORCE
2
(2012),
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_
Workers_Brookings.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VLY-TQXS].
The percentage of immigrations as a proportion of the total population is approaching
the historic highs of nearly 15% at the turn of the nineteenth century. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 19, at 3. In absolute numbers, the country has never seen numbers of
foreign-born residents remotely approaching that of the past decade. In 1920, for example, at
the end of the Golden Era, the foreign-born population stood at 13.9 million; in 2010, it was
forty million. Id.
180. NAHB Economics, Immigrant Workers in the Construction Labor Force,
HOUSINGECONOMICS.COM
(Feb.
3,
2015),
https://www.nahbclassic.org/
generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=241345&channelID=311 [https://perma.cc/
9ZV3-QFBL].
181. P’SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON., supra note 178, at 5. Accommodation workers include
hotel maids and janitors.
182. Immigration and the Rural Workforce, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/immigration-and-the-rural-workforce.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2LQR-Z463].
In specific, immigrant-heavy states and/or occupations, the percentage of immigrants is
considerably higher. See, e.g., Christian González-Rivera, Where Immigrant New Yorkers Go
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immigrant concentrations are even higher: for example, almost 74% of young Silicon
Valley computer and mathematical workers,183 and between 77–91% of less-skilled
construction workers in New York City, depending on their trade, are immigrants.184
To be clear, a relatively small proportion of permanent residents are actually
admitted to the United States on the basis of employment.185 Temporary visas
permitting the holder to work in the United States are much more common.186 But
whatever the category through which they enter—including as refugees, as family
members of U.S. permanent residents or citizens, or without authorization187—

to Work, CTR. FOR AN URBAN FUTURE (Oct. 2016), https://nycfuture.org/data/immigrantworkers-data-brief [https://perma.cc/M98T-CNAS] (analyzing concentration of immigrants in
a range of occupations within New York City). While immigrants are disproportionately
represented in the service industries that are less of an obvious fit with the traditional definition
of interstate commerce, more than three quarters of them work outside the service sector in
industries ranging from commercial agriculture that put goods in the stream of interstate
commerce to manufacturing. Seventeen percent of the foreign-born workforce is in the
manufacturing sector. Elizabeth Grieco & Brian Ray, Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. Labor
Force, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/mexican-immigrants-us-labor-force [https://perma.cc/EF2A-5CMF].
183. Press Release, Joint Venture Silicon Valley, Joint Venture Silicon Valley’s Annual
Economic Study Shows Bay Area Hard Pressed to Handle Continuing Prosperity, (Feb. 10,
2016), http://www.jointventure.org/2016-index-news-release [https://perma.cc/W4W4-JK7N].
184. González-Rivera, supra note 182.
185. In fiscal year 2015, approximately 137,893 individuals were admitted to permanent
residence through the employment-based categories. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, TABLE 6.
PERSONS OBTAINING LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND MAJOR CLASS OF
ADMISSION: FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2016, (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2016/table6 [.
186. A reliable recent analysis places the number of temporary work visas issued in 2013
at 1.42 million. Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary Foreign Workers by the
Numbers: New Estimates by Visa Classification, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 7, 2017),
http://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-new-estimatesby-visa-classification [https://perma.cc/X9S8-2A35].
187. In fiscal year 2016, the last for which statistics are available, the Department of
Homeland Security reports that the United States admitted 1,183,505 immigrants to permanent
residence in the following categories:
Immediate Relatives: 566,706
Family-sponsored: 238,087
Employment-based: 137,893
Refugee: 120,216
Asylee: 37,209
“Diversity” lottery: 49,865
(fewer than thirty thousand via other categories)
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 185.
In 2013 (the most recent for which analysts have complete data), approximately 1.42
million noncitizens entered the United States on temporary visas primarily granted for work
purposes. COSTA & ROSENBAUM, supra note 186.The authors note that this represents
approximately 1% of the U.S. work force.
Finally, the Pew Charitable Trust estimates that 350,000 undocumented immigrants
entered the United States in 2015. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016),
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almost all immigrants in the United States are denied access to public benefits and
must seek employment in order to support themselves and their dependents.188
Immigrants participate in the labor force at rates higher than their native counterparts:
they make up 13% of the total population but nearly 17% of workers. They are also
unusually economically active as entrepreneurs and small-business owners,
launching new enterprises at twice the rate of the native born.189 From the perspective
of many foreign governments in immigrant-origin countries, meanwhile, remittances
from emigrants working in the United States are a major source of GDP.190
The Supreme Court itself has not infrequently referenced control of the domestic
job market as an important purpose of and justification for immigration regulation,
including with regard to aspects of immigration law that make no mention of
employment.191
B. The Foreign Commerce Clause Argument
In many ways, then, immigration is a prototypical economic activity with both
domestic and international impact. But under a contemporary understanding of the
Commerce Clause, is immigration commerce?

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-immigrant-populationstable-for-half-a-decade [https://perma.cc/RSU4-Z2MX]. Pew estimates the total
undocumented population in 2015 at 11.1 million. Jens Manual Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel &
D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27,
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigrationin-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/875V-NWQ9].
188. In broad strokes: with the exception of refugees, all legal permanent residents are
ineligible for means-tested federal benefits for five years after admission. Temporary
immigrants and undocumented immigrants are barred from almost all federal benefits. For a
detailed overview of these rules, see TANYA BRODER, AVIDEH MOUSSAVIAN & JONATHAN
BLAZER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
PROGRAMS (Dec. 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overviewimmeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZB-VWXC]. President Trump has
suggested that he will tighten these restrictions further. See Draft Executive Orders on
Immigration, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/draftexecutive-orders-on-immigration/2315 [https://perma.cc/9SJD-FZK4].
189. EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WELCOMING
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS (Sept. 8, 2015).
190. WORLD BANK GROUP, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2016 (2016),
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/
4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9BW-M5X4]. “Migrants are
now sending earnings back to their families in developing countries at levels above US$441
billion, a figure three times the volume of official aid flows.” Id. at iv. “In 2015, the top
recipient countries of recorded remittances were India, China, the Philippines, Mexico, and
France. As a share of GDP, however, smaller countries such as Tajikistan (42 percent), the
Kyrgyz Republic (30 percent), Nepal (29 percent), Tonga (28 percent), and Moldova (26
percent) were the largest recipients.” Id. at v–vi. Worldwide, “[t]he United States is by far the
largest [source of remittances], with an estimated $ 56.3 billion in recorded outflows in 2014.”
Id. at vi.
191. See infra Part III.D.2.
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At first glance, the Foreign Commerce Clause seems to be a more obvious modern
source of the immigration power than its domestic counterpart. Today, it is not
uncommon for federal courts to note that the immigration power “derives from
various sources,”192 including the Foreign Commerce Clause.193 While this recital
has a rote quality, as it is rarely accompanied by an affirmative argument that the
Commerce Clause does or should undergird the immigration power,194 it would not
be difficult to make such an assertion.195 Immigration is the movement of people
from other countries into the United States, where most will work. It is of critical
economic importance to many foreign governments because of the remittances
migrants send home from the United States, and to this country because of its reliance
on immigrants to fill particular categories of jobs in both low- and high-wage sectors.
The prior line of cases tying the immigration power to foreign commerce remains
available to draw on, having never been explicitly rejected by the Court.196
Recognizing the relationship between foreign commerce and immigration would
not, however, clear the field of obstacles. As a preliminary matter, the Commerce
Clause grants power only to Congress, not the executive branch. As Adam Cox and
Cristina Rodriguez point out in their article, The President and Immigration Law, the
Supreme Court has at times stated that the executive has inherent authority over
immigration, independent of Congress.197 If rooting the immigration authority in the

192. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
193. See, e.g., id. (“Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various
sources, including the Federal Government’s . . . power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations’”); Korab v. Fink, 797 F. 3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2012). For an examination of the very
few instances in which federal courts mention the Interstate Commerce Clause in relation to
the immigration power, see infra Part III.C.2.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991, 991 n.4 (D. Ariz. 2010),
aff’d 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 567 U.S. 387
(2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court
has consistently ruled that the federal government has broad and exclusive authority to regulate
immigration, supported by both enumerated and implied constitutional powers. . . . A variety
of enumerated powers implicate the federal government’s long-recognized immigration
power, including the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and the Migration and
Importation Clause.”) (citing relevant constitutional provisions, Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889)).
195. Several scholars touch on the idea as a part of broader analyses, including LEGOMSKY,
supra note 15, at 186; Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 866 (“The power to regulate the admission
and residence of aliens may be securely located in the commerce power or implied from a
structural analysis of the Constitution.”); Balkin, supra note 15, at 26–27 (comparing the
commerce power to the naturalization power: “But there is a far more obvious source of the
power to regulate the flow of populations across the nation’s borders. It is the commerce power
. . . . The eighteenth-century definition of commerce as ‘intercourse’ or ‘exchange’ among
different peoples easily encompasses immigration and emigration of populations for any
purpose, whether economic or noneconomic.”); Chin, supra note 15, at 56–57.
196. See supra Part III.A.
197. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 47, at 462–63. The existence of the President’s
independent immigration authority is reinforced by two major instances the authors recount in
which the President has acted inconsistently with congressional instructions, and that action
has either been unchallenged or been upheld by the Court. Id. at 483–528.

2018]

I MMIG RA TIO N AS COMM ER CE

691

Commerce Clause would facilitate greater judicial review of legislative but not
presidential action, a critical part of immigration policy would be left behind under
the plenary power doctrine, providing no answer to pressing questions about the
legality of presidential actions on immigration.
The simplest response to this concern is to note that, in contemporary times, the
executive is granted most of its immigration power by statute. Cox and Rodriguez
observe that this delegated authority is extensive: among other elements, it includes
prosecutorial discretion to decide whether or not to pursue the deportation of
noncitizens within the categories for removal established by the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which the authors estimate to affect about a third of the noncitizens
present in the United States.198 Were the Commerce Clause to be understood as the
source of the immigration power, federal courts could review the constitutionality of
Congress’s instructions, and then of the President’s actions pursuant to them.
An equally critical concern is whether re-rooting the immigration power in the
Foreign Commerce Clause with the goal of granting immigrants greater access to
constitutional rights would merely trade one plenary power for another. In Gibbons
v. Ogden, Justice Marshall famously states that the Commerce Clause power, “like
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.”199 This oft-quoted line appears to assert plenary status for
congressional action under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
The cases that link the immigration power to the Foreign Commerce Clause are
of little help in grasping the appropriate standard of review. They are over a century
old, with no real judicial consideration of the question in the interim. They are also
inconsistent. In two immigration cases just before and after the Chinese Exclusion
Case, both based on the assumption that the federal immigration power derived from
the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court considered this question and
reached opposing conclusions.
In Chew Heong v. United States, decided in 1884, the Supreme Court approached
the interpretation of an act of Congress related to immigration as it would have any
other legislation at the time.200 Like the Chinese Exclusion Case five years later,
Chew Heong challenged aspects of the Chinese Exclusion Act as in violation of an
1880 treaty through which the United States promised Chinese citizens present

198. Id. at 463–65. Cox and Rodriguez argue that about a third of noncitizens present in
the United States fall within a deportation category and can be removed at the discretion of
the President. Id. at 463. They describe this as an ex post screening system that “operates as a
substitute for front-end policymaking power; both are possible methods of achieving a
particular size and composition of immigrants.” Id. at 464.
199. 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
200. 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884). In Chew Heong, the underlying statute was the 1882
Chinese Exclusion Act and its amendments in 1884, and the challenged provision was its
requirement of a certificate of reentry for Chinese noncitizens who had departed the United
States but had been in the country prior to the passage of the Act and now sought to return,
including Chew Heong. Id. at 536–37. This was prior to the 1888 amendments to the Act, at
issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which voided all such certificates. Chew Heong had been
outside the country when the requirement arose, and thus was not able to obtain the required
certificate. Id.
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before the Act the ability to “go and come of their own free will.”201 In the Chinese
Exclusion Case, Justice Field would dismiss this treaty as irrelevant, invalidated by
the Act’s subsequent passage.202 For Justice Harlan, however, considering the
question at a time when the federal immigration power was still understood to be
derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Court had an obligation to read
Congress’s later action as consistent with the treaty, thus requiring that Chew Heong
be permitted to return to the United States. Justice Harlan characterized Congress’s
use of the immigration power in this instance as a potential threat to sovereignty—
not an exercise of it as in the Chinese Exclusion Case—unless it could be limited by
the courts.203
In Oceanic Steam Navigation v. Stranahan,204 decided twenty years after the
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court takes a different position.205 In that case, a
challenge to the constitutionality of a federal immigration statute, addressed in more
depth above, does not mention the Chinese Exclusion Case, foreign affairs, or the
matter of sovereignty. It discusses the immigration power solely as a derivative of
the Foreign Commerce Clause. And yet, it repeatedly says that Congress’s power
over immigration is “absolute” and “plenary.”206 Oceanic Steam, not the Chinese
Exclusion Case, provides the oft-cited assertion regarding immigration that “over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.”207 Relying
on Oceanic Steam, Kif Augustine-Adams has thus argued that “[g]rounding the
power to exclude aliens in the Foreign Commerce Clause, rather than in sovereignty,

201. Immigration Treaty of 1880, China-U.S., art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. The
language from the treaty is quoted in Chew Heong at 542. For discussion of Chew Heong, see
Lindsay, supra note 15, at 29–31.
202. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
203. Lindsay, supra note 15, at 31. “Notwithstanding its expansive scope . . . the federal
immigration power of the 1870s and 1880s remained a creature of and subject to the U.S.
Constitution.” Id. at 23.
204. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
205. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 719–21. “In sum, Supreme Court
jurisprudence has limited congressional power under the Domestic Commerce Clause, but that
case law does not address the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719. “Even when
recognizing the Foreign Commerce Clause as a basis for congressional control over
immigration, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the Bill of Rights to a noncitizen’s claim
to remain in the United States.” Id. at 719–20 (citing Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290
(1904)). In Turner, the Court relies on the Chinese Exclusion Case in rejecting a challenge to
a federal statute excluding and deporting noncitizen anarchists, saying that Congress’s
decision was “not open to constitutional objection,” and says that it would have reached same
result under Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. Turner, 194 U.S. at 290.
206. E.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 214 U.S. at 343 (“[T]he plenary power of
Congress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose
the penalty . . . .”).
207. Id. at 339. Furthering this concern, see, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Servs., 758 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1985): “Although in the present case
the INS acts pursuant to the immigration clause of Article I, § 9 rather than the Commerce
Clause, congressional authority under both clauses is plenary.” (citation omitted to Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)—although that case does not, in fact, mention
commerce.).
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may be a starting point for applying constitutional protections in immigration law. It
is not, however, an entirely clean beginning.”208
Nonetheless, most other scholars who have considered the question offer a more
optimistic assessment of the standard of constitutional review that would attend a
renewed link between the Foreign Commerce Clause and the immigration power.209
Cases outside the immigration arena make clear that Congress’s actions under the
foreign commerce power are subject to constitutional review. The sweep of the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the question is typified by its assertion in
Buckley v. Valeo210 that “Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has
substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not
offend some other constitutional restriction.”211 Justice Marshall, of course, says the
same with specific reference to the Commerce Clause in the Gibbons quote above,
holding Congress’s power to legislate under that clause “acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”212 This line of cases offers
support for the claims by Alexander Aleinikoff, Jack Chin, Sarah Cleveland, and
others, that while the foreign commerce power may be plenary, it is still subject to
baseline constitutional constraints—and would remain so even in the immigration
context.213
C. The Interstate Commerce Clause Argument
1. Immigration in Relation to Modern Interstate Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The argument that the regulation of immigration falls within the ambit of the
Interstate Commerce Clause has barely been made by litigants or courts, much less

208. Augustine-Adams, supra note 15, at 721. She elaborates: “While there may be no
question that the Bill of Rights limits Congress’ authority under the Domestic Commerce
Clause, the answer is far from clear with respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id. at 719.
209. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 866 (acknowledging that “the commerce power
has been labeled ‘plenary.’ . . . [But] [e]liminating the talk of sovereignty and inherent power
[present in the immigration plenary power doctrine] ought to help decision makers recognize
that the immigration power does not stand above or before the Constitution.”); Chin, supra
note 15, at 56–57 (“Because there is no question that the commerce authority is limited by the
Bill of Rights, if the Court reverted to its original theory of immigration power, constitutional
immigration law would be brought in to the mainstream.”); Lindsay, supra note 15, at 55
(“Recasting the federal immigration power as but one instance of Congress’s ‘plenary’ power
to regulate commerce, for example, would carry with it a presumption that regulations of
immigrants and immigration are subject to the same substantive, judicially enforceable
constitutional norms as most other federal laws . . . .”).
210. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
211. Id. at 132 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
212. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 15, at 279 (“Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the federal
commerce power has been recognized as ‘plenary,’ at least with respect to federal-state
relations. Yet Congress may not constitutionally exercise its authority under the commerce
power to discriminate overtly on the basis of race, to deny basic First Amendment rights, or
to violate other fundamental constitutional protections which are routinely waived in
immigration cases.”); see also Lindsay, supra note 15, at 55.
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gained traction. Despite the door that Darby and Wickard would seem to have opened
to understanding immigration as a part of interstate commerce, not a single federal
circuit court case since they were decided cites them for that purpose. Academics
have been similarly silent. Like courts, although scholars and advocates have amply
criticized the origins and impact of the plenary power doctrine, and some academics
in passing have argued for consideration of the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source
of the immigration power,214 none have contended that the Interstate Commerce
Clause should stand alone or alongside the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of
the immigration power.
If this argument was not made when Wickard was the last word on the Interstate
Commerce Clause, it seems less likely to gain traction now, once Lopez, Morrison,
and Sebelius have narrowed the scope of interstate commerce. Yet, I assert this more
recent line of cases does not close the door to the idea that the federal immigration
power could be rooted in the Interstate Commerce Clause. Indeed, immigration law
more easily falls within the restricted boundaries of the Commerce Clause announced
in Lopez and Morrison than either guns near schools or gender-based crimes of
violence. I rely on three points in reaching this conclusion. First, with regard to the
category at issue in Lopez and Morrison, “whether the regulated activity
‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce,”215 immigration is more fundamentally
and directly an economic activity than guns near schools or violence against women.
In addition, and critically, immigration does not raise the specter of federal
infringement on traditional arenas of state action that so clearly preoccupied the
Court in those two cases. Finally, separate and apart from the argument that
immigration substantially affects commerce, it should also be considered within an
additional category announced by Rehnquist in Lopez: the regulation of “persons or
things in interstate commerce.”216
Regarding the link between commercial activity and the target of the regulation,
in Lopez and Morrison, Justice Rehnquist rejects what he terms the “‘costs of crime’
and ‘national productivity’ arguments”217 offered about the impact of guns near
schools and violence against women on the economy. He characterizes them as “butfor reasoning” that would open the doors to federal regulation of just about anything,
including in spheres traditionally reserved to the states.218 For immigration, however,
there is a strong case to be made that the regulated activity is itself economic, with
no causal arguments necessary. Again, immigrants are usually economic actors
whether or not their visa is granted under an employment category.219 No less than

214. See supra note 15.
215. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
216. Id. at 558.
217. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
218. Id. at 613.
219. Also, recall that the test is not whether the challenged activities affect commerce, but
could Congress have so concluded. “We need not determine whether respondents’ activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22(2005) (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). “That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no
moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of
that larger scheme.” Id.
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those who enter after being sponsored by an employer, refugees and those who are
admitted as siblings of citizens must work.220 There are exceptions, of course, but
they do not undermine Congress’s authority to regulate immigration under the
Interstate Commerce Clause. As the Supreme Court has stated “where a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character
of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”221
Second, immigration presents quite a different picture as to the concern in both
Lopez and Morrison that an expansive understanding of the Interstate Commerce
Clause would encroach on traditional realms of state power. While education and
criminal law have historically (although perhaps less exclusively than Justice
Rehnquist would have it) been governed by the states, immigration is a traditional
subject of federal regulation.222 To declare that the power to regulate immigration
derives from the Commerce Clause would not change the 180-year understanding
that immigration is fundamentally an area of federal control.223 In that sense, the
immigration-as-interstate-commerce argument poses little threat to the established
boundaries between the state and the federal, the policing of which motivates the
Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison. Rather, it would tie an area of admittedly
federal control more closely to the Constitution, a development that would seem
normatively allied with Justice Rehnquist’s emphasis in Morrison that “[e]very law
enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution.”224
Third, while in Lopez and Morrison the Court analyzed the law at hand under only
one of the three potential categories of Commerce Clause regulation announced in
Lopez—that related to “‘substantial effect[s]’ on interstate commerce”225—in the

220. On refugees, see my arguments in Jennifer Gordon, Refugees as Low-Wage Workers,
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
221. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled on other grounds by
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
222. See supra Part I.
223. None of this is to imply that all regulation affecting immigrants is reserved to the
federal government. The states have always retained their police powers with regard to
governing immigrants, even as the scope of those powers has been interpreted differently over
time. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 641 F.3d
339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). There is a rich literature on
immigration federalism exploring the boundary between state and federal powers over
immigration, particularly in the context of active state and local efforts over the past two
decades to either protect immigrants from federal enforcement of immigration law or to enact
measures more restrictive than federal immigration law. See, e.g., PRATHEEPAN
GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015);
Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 577 (2012); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism
Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007).
224. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
225. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557, 559–60 (1995); see also Morrison, 529
U.S. at 611.
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case of immigration, another of the options offers a distinct basis. A separate category
announced in Lopez includes regulation of “persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”226 Immigrants
would seem to fit this description. They not only are more active in the labor market
than natives but are more mobile between states in response to changes in demand.
Recent studies of interstate migration in response to the Great Recession affirm the
assertion of Harvard economist George Borjas some years ago that “immigration
greases the wheels of the labor market by injecting into the economy a group of
persons who are very responsive to regional differences in economic
opportunities.”227 This argument is bolstered by the impact of immigrants on the state
and national economies noted above.
Thus, under the test announced in Lopez and Morrison, there are viable arguments
that the Interstate Commerce Clause can undergird the federal government’s
immigration power. Post-Raich, however, to advance the position that immigration
falls under the Interstate Commerce Clause, one must also contend that the regulation
of the economic and noneconomic aspects of immigration are together part of an
indivisible scheme.228 In other words, removing control over labor migration from
the immigration statute would leave behind a scheme that was incoherent and/or still
had an impact on interstate commerce.229
This is a fairly straightforward argument to make. To excise the temporary and
permanent employment visa categories from the statute would not be sufficient to
separate out labor migration because the eleven million undocumented workers in
the United States are largely labor migrants. (In this context, it is worth noting that
in the few cases that address the issue, most federal courts have found no impediment

226. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
227. George J. Borjas, Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?, 2001
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 69, 70 (2001); Mark Ellis, Richard Wright & Matthew
Townley, State-Scale Immigration Enforcement and Latino Interstate Migration in the United
States, 106 ANNALS AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS 891 (2016).
228. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (“One need not have a degree in economics
to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs)
locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors,
and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
extraordinarily popular substance.”).
229. Immigration raises this question in a somewhat different way than Raich. In Raich,
the question was whether severing the regulation of privately grown medical marijuana
(asserted by the plaintiffs to be unrelated to commerce) from the larger federal scheme
regulating drugs (which was assumed to have a relationship to commerce) would leave a
coherent regulatory scheme behind or whether an exemption for the former would undermine
the integrity of the latter. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 (framing the question as “whether Congress’
contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision to include this narrower ‘class of activities’ within
the larger regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient.”). In the immigration context, the
question is whether the regulatory scheme could coherently be divided in two: one part directly
addressing labor migration and mobile immigrant workers in interstate commerce (assumed
to be an economic phenomenon) and the other, larger part regulating immigration unrelated to
commerce. In what follows, I argue that the two are not divisible because both relate to the
impact of immigration on commerce and should be regulated together to create a coherent
regulatory scheme.
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to including undocumented immigrants within the scope of the Interstate Commerce
Clause.230) Undocumented men have the highest labor-force participation rates of
anyone in the United States: 91% as compared to 84% for legal immigrants and 79%
for native workers.231 Measures regarding border and interior enforcement of
immigration law thus would have to be removed from the statute as well. This would
leave behind an immigration law without immigration control, which few would
consider a coherent scheme of regulation. In addition, excising the explicitly laborrelated aspects of the statute—resulting in a law that sets terms for entry and
continued presence of noncitizens only on the basis of family ties, refugee status,
study, and other non-work-related factors—would not eliminate the direct impact of
immigration on the U.S. labor market. As noted above, immigrants lawfully admitted
through nonemployment categories work in large numbers.232
If this argument proves persuasive, Raich then opens the door more widely to
linking immigration to interstate commerce. In Raich, the Court reiterates a key
aspect of the Wickard holding: “When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class,”233 even
if some of the activity is purely local. In addition, the critical question is not whether
the activity at issue “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”234
There is no question that laws passed by Congress pursuant to its interstate
commerce authority can be subject to judicial review for constitutionality. Setting

230. See, e.g., United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982). This is
consistent with Commerce Clause jurisprudence about Congress’s power to regulate other
kinds of illegal economic activity. See, e.g.,Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. But see United States v.
Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11405085, at *9 (D. Ariz. Dec 10, 2010) (in
the context of deciding defendant Arizona’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the argument of
plaintiff United States that “it is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause for Arizona to
regulate the interstate movement of people who are not lawfully present in the United States.”).
“Edwards is distinguishable because, in that case, the underlying conduct (being indigent) was
not unlawful.” Id.
231. Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental
Affairs, 114th Cong. 7, fig.3 (2015) (written testimony of Jeffrey S. Passel, Senior
Demographer, Pew Research Center). The reverse is true, however, for undocumented women.
Id. However, men make up the majority of the undocumented population. Ariel G. Ruiz, Jie
Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Women in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(Mar.
20,
2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-women-unitedstates#Unauthorized Population [https://perma.cc/FX6Y-DWXW].
232. This focus on paid work is not meant to marginalize immigrants whose motive for
migrating is noneconomic or those who are less likely to work for pay on arrival, such as
mothers migrating with children, older adults migrating to be reunited with their families, and
disabled people. My argument is that, in its totality, it is a better description of the impact of
immigration to say that it is economic than to characterize it as a threat to sovereignty or
national security.
233. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). “The CSA is a statute that regulates the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established,
and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 26.
234. Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
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aside the Wickard-Lopez line of cases, which is about the extent of the commerce
power itself, the Supreme Court is not infrequently called on to assess whether
legislation that incontrovertibly falls under Congress’s interstate commerce authority
nonetheless infringes on other constitutional provisions. In such situations, the Court
has not hesitated to review the statute—and indeed to strike it down. The Supreme
Court has stated clearly that “[c]ongressional enactments which may be fully within
the grant of legislative authority contained in the [Interstate] Commerce Clause may
nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to trial by jury
contained in the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”235 The Tenth Amendment is another common source of challenge to
government action under the Interstate Commerce Clause. In New York v. United
States, for example, the Court held unconstitutional a provision of a federal law that
required states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste within their own borders.236
There was no assertion that the provision itself exceeded the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Instead, it was struck down because it conflicted with the Tenth
Amendment by “commandeer[ing]” state governments in an arena where the
Amendment reserved power to the states.237
2. Discussion of Immigration as Interstate Commerce in Contemporary Case Law
Paradoxically, the only contemporary case in which a circuit court considers
whether congressional regulation of individual immigrants is tied to the Commerce
Clause appears in a challenge not to an immigration law but to the Hobbs Act, which
criminalizes robbery that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce “or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce.”238 In United States v. Hanigan, the
government sought to use the Hobbs Act to prosecute a man who robbed and tortured
three undocumented Mexican immigrants.239 The Act defines “commerce” as
coextensive with the scope of the Commerce Clause.240 The defendant challenged
the government’s prosecution and the underlying statute on the grounds that migrants
were not articles of commerce, and even if they were, regulation impacting
“undocumented alien laborers” fell outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause

235. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976), overruled on other grounds
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (citations omitted).
236. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
237. Id. at 176; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
238. United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The Hobbs Act
makes it a federal crime to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce ‘or the movement of any article
or commodity in commerce, by robbery . . . .’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012))). “The
Hobbs Act definition of commerce is coextensive with the constitutional definition.” Id. at
1130. The court also cited Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173–74 (1941), noting that
“intercourse” in the Commerce Clause includes the movement of persons. Id. See also Service
Machine & Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1980), which struck
down a registration fee imposed on all workers as a hindrance to migrant labor.
239. 681 F.2d at 1128–29.
240. Id. at 1129–30 (“As defined in the Act, commerce includes ‘all . . . other commerce
over which the United States has jurisdiction.’”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2012)).
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authority.241 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court noted that
“[t]he statute by its terms does not limit ‘commerce’ to the flow of legally condoned
articles. Nor could the [C]ommerce [C]lause itself mean that an activity to be
regulated by Congress must be legally permissible.”242 The case holds that “the
movement of undocumented alien laborers across a national boundary into this
country is within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate [under the
Commerce Clause].”243
The few cases where immigration regulation itself has been discussed in relation
to the Commerce Clause are all in lower courts, and only one of them touches on the
questions just raised with regard to Lopez. In the context of recent litigation
challenging state laws creating restrictions on immigrants, advocates—and, under
the Obama administration, the government itself—attempted to advance the Dormant
Commerce Clause argument that such laws impermissibly burden interstate and
foreign commerce.244 In general, district courts have found this position unpersuasive
as applied to the state laws under consideration. For example, the relationship
between interstate commerce and immigration undergirded a Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis in the unreported 2010 opinion of the Arizona U.S. District Court
considering the legality of Arizona’s “attrition through enforcement” law.245 The
Solicitor General argued that the Arizona law—which created new state penalties for
offenses ranging from transporting and hiring undocumented immigrants to making
unlawful presence a state trespassing violation—“offends the Dormant Commerce
Clause by restricting the interstate movement of aliens.”246 The district court agreed
that “the regulation of immigration does have an impact on interstate commerce,”247
but since the state law in question did not explicitly limit the entry of immigrants to
Arizona, instead prohibiting conduct already banned by federal law, the United

241. Id. at 1129.
242. Id. at 1131
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d
641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 567 U.S. 287 (2012),
and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); Brief for the League of United
Latin American Citizens, et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645).
245. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. at 988.
“Attrition through enforcement” refers to the idea, popularized by the restrictionistpolicy organization, the Center for Immigration Studies, that undocumented immigrants will
leave the country (“self-deport”) if the government closes off access to housing, employment,
drivers’ licenses, and medical care. The theory undergirded many state and local antiimmigrant initiatives in the 2000s. For a summary of and argument for the strategy, see JESSICA
M. VAUGHAN, ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A COST-EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO SHRINK
THE
ILLEGAL
POPULATION,
CTR.
FOR
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES
(2006),
http://cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation [https://perma.cc/VQT6-MCC8]; Kris W.
Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155 (2008).
246. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (citation omitted).
247. Id.
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States failed to show that the Arizona law raised this concern.248 Higher courts
declined to consider the Commerce Clause issue on appeal.249
United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, a 1997 Southern District of California case
in which a noncitizen with a record of multiple deportations challenged the legality
of provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act setting out the consequences
for unlawful reentry following deportation,250 is the one published post-Lopez federal
court decision to seriously consider whether the immigration power derives from the
Commerce Clause. There, the court states plainly that
[t]he fact that prior precedent recognizes Congress’s power over
immigration as an incident of sovereignty does not signify that Congress
could not regulate immigration under the auspices of one of its
enumerated powers. Accordingly, even if Congress could not enact
criminal immigration sanctions pursuant to the inherent power of a
sovereign nation, § 1326 would still be constitutional as an exercise of
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.251
The opinion goes on to assert that:
[i]t is undeniable that the entry of foreign nationals could affect both
foreign and interstate commerce. Indeed, one can assume that many
individuals enter the United States illegally because of their desire to find
better economic opportunities here. Such individuals provide both an
inexpensive source of foreign labor, and a market for domestic goods and
services, thereby affecting both interstate and foreign commerce.252
Having decided that immigration is tied to the commerce power, the court then
rejects the contention that in this instance Congress exceeded the boundaries set forth
in Lopez.
‘[T]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.’ In the present case, however, the
illegal entry of foreign nationals after deportation does substantially
affect interstate commerce. Moreover, individuals who enter the country

248. Id. The court of appeals and Supreme Court cases reversing and affirming the District
Court’s decision did not discuss the Commerce Clause argument.
Similarly, in United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1328–29 (N.D. Ala. 2011), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), the district court
rejected the U.S. government’s argument that the Alabama law imposed an excessive burden
on interstate commerce and therefore dismissed the Commerce Clause portion of the federal
government’s argument. The section in question was nonetheless enjoined on the grounds that
it was preempted under federal immigration law. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301.
249. In neither the Arizona nor the Alabama case appeals did the circuit court or the
Supreme Court discuss the Commerce Clause issue.
250. 963 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 147 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998).
251. Id. at 937.
252. Id. at 937–38.
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illegally provide a source of labor, thereby constituting ‘persons or things
in interstate commerce.’253
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on sovereignty grounds; it
did not reach the commerce argument.254
D. What Do We Get from Conceiving of Immigration as Commerce?
1. Impact Overall
If the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses were recognized as sources of the
contemporary federal immigration authority, that power would have a far firmer
anchor in the Constitution than it does under current jurisprudence. Of course, taking
this step will not eliminate the plenary power doctrine in one fell swoop. The
constitutional source of a particular governmental power is related to, but not the sole
determinant of, the degree to which courts will review government action in that
arena for violations of individual constitutional rights.255 Nor will it automatically
divorce immigration questions from sovereignty or national security concerns.
Whatever the source of the power, the government can always assert that any policy
related to control over immigration implicates sovereignty, or that national security
concerns motivate its promulgation of a particular policy, in an effort to persuade
courts to give it room to operate unfettered.256
With this in mind, this Article is pragmatic in its claims and its argument. Its goal
is to counteract the reflexive assumption embedded in the plenary power doctrine’s
tie to sovereignty and foreign affairs that all immigration law relates to foreign
relations and/or national security. This assumption encourages judges to default to a
position of deference without an actual inquiry about whether it is appropriate given
the immigration policy in question.257 This Article seeks to build a stronger
constitutional undergirding for the immigration power, one that reminds judges that
in the main, immigration is an economic issue, and that there is no reason to deviate

253. Id. at 938 (citations omitted).
254. Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d at 1078.
255. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 19.
256. See, e.g., Justice Alito’s dissent in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121–29
(2018). Pereira was a statutory interpretation case on the technical question of whether a
notification of removal proceedings that did not contain a hearing date qualified as a “notice
to appear,” a document whose service would have stopped plaintiff Pereira from accruing
additional time toward eligibility for relief from deportation under a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. An 8-1 majority of the Court agreed with the plaintiff’s
interpretation of the statute, ruling that a notification without a hearing date was not a notice
to appear. Despite the lack of any link between this issue and foreign affairs or national
security, Justice Alito argued that the majority should have endorsed the government’s
opposite interpretation, as deference to the government in the immigration context “‘is
especially appropriate…’ because of the potential foreign-policy implications.” Id. at 2122;
see also Lindsay, supra note 63, at 241.
257. See Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
supra note 4 at 261–69.
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from ordinary standards of judicial review when faced with most claims about
constitutional rights violations in the immigration context.
A recognition that the Commerce Clause grounds the government’s immigration
power has the potential to reorient the federal courts’ degree of constitutional
analysis of immigration questions in several important ways.
First, returning to the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of the government’s
immigration authority ties modern immigration jurisprudence to the historical
understanding of the immigration power adopted in the early immigration federalism
cases. Those cases arose under the Foreign Commerce Clause and were about
federalism—that is, whether the states or the federal government had the power to
regulate immigration—rather than individual rights. Nonetheless, it is significant
that, as it answered these federalism questions, the Supreme Court treated the
immigration power as nonexceptional with regard to the Constitution. Although early
immigration cases were not explicitly about the Interstate Commerce Clause, in
deciding them, the justices often spoke of the power to regulate immigrants from
abroad as having the same constitutional origin and limitations as the power to
regulate migrants between states, reasoning that a holding about one would also
apply to the other.258 This offers some indication that during the nineteenth century
the Supreme Court did not contemplate that all uses of the immigration power would
be subject to a more deferential standard of constitutional review.
Second, the addition of the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of the
immigration power grounds that authority even more firmly in an arena without any
carve-outs from constitutional oversight. As I note in Part III.B, although courts have
explicitly held that government actions under the Foreign Commerce Clause are
subject to constitutional constraints, there is a danger that locating immigration only
in the foreign branch of the Commerce Clause might create echoes of foreign policy
concerns requiring deference to the political branches. The Interstate Commerce
Clause as a constitutional source of the immigration power signals that the
government’s exercise of that authority arises from a power under which courts
routinely review government actions for constitutionality. The default assumption is
that a government action rooted in the Interstate Commerce Clause receives ordinary
review in the face of a challenge to the action’s constitutionality.
Finally, an immigration power that arises from the Commerce Clause highlights
the economic nature of most immigration. It serves as a reminder that the vast
majority of immigration law is about the daily management of a flow of noncitizens
who contribute to the U.S. economy through tourism, investment, purchases, and
labor. Most immigration statutes, regulations, and policies relate to routine matters
of bureaucratic processing and management of this flow. Aspects of immigration law
that do address national security or foreign affairs are generally contained in discrete
statutory provisions, regulations, or policy documents that explicitly reference such
concerns.259 The remaining majority of the federal government’s exercises of the

258. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 417 (Wayne, J., concurring)
(arguing that the federal power to regulate the movement of human beings across borders
applies in the same way to interstate and foreign commerce); see also Matthew J. Lindsay,
Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 781–
82, 784–85 (2013).
259. The inadmissibility grounds related to terrorism and foreign policy are examples. See
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immigration power are grounded in the central concerns of the Commerce Clause.
This insight offers an important counternarrative to the government’s repeated claims
in litigation that foreign affairs and national security are the drivers of all aspects of
immigration policy, and that immigration law as a whole should thus receive greater
judicial deference.
2. Impact on Constitutional Challenges to Different Classes of Immigration Policies
Grounding the immigration power in the Commerce Clause is likely to have a
different impact on judicial review depending on the nature of the underlying law
being challenged. I will consider the effect of such a shift on three categories of
immigration policies: those that are intended to regulate employment-related visas
or otherwise address concerns about labor market competition; those that set general
categories and procedures for admission and removal, unrelated to employment or
to national security concerns; and those that specifically address foreign affairs or
national security concerns.
a. Immigration Policies Related to Employment and Labor Competition
The arguments put forth in this Article are likely to have the greatest impact where
plaintiffs challenge an aspect of immigration law or policy that directly regulates
immigrant employment or that was enacted in response to labor market concerns.
The latter category, I would argue, includes almost all provisions regulating
undocumented immigrants. The Supreme Court has not infrequently asserted that
immigration restrictions are motivated by the need to limit competition for work
within the United States. In 1991, for example, in a case upholding the validity of a
regulation requiring that the Attorney General bar unauthorized work as a bond
condition for noncitizens in removal proceedings, a unanimous Court stated that
protecting U.S. workers against displacement was an “established concern of
immigration law.”260 Looking to past cases, the opinion noted, “We have often
recognized that a ‘primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for
American workers.’”261
In the context of a constitutional challenge to an aspect of immigration law that
sets out the routes through which noncitizens can enter the United States for the
purposes of employment; or that penalizes unlawful entry, presence in the country
without admission, or visa overstay; plaintiffs can trace the power to enact such a
provision to the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses and the government’s
acknowledged right to control the movement of noncitizen workers (by now clearly
understood as “commerce”)262 across its borders. In recognizing this connection, the
Court would be in line with longstanding interpretations of the Foreign Commerce
Clause and the modern understanding of the Interstate Commerce Clause. While
there is no question that regulating immigration to limit labor competition remains a

Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2012).
260. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991).
261. Id. (citing Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)).
262. See supra Parts II.B.1, III.B.
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federal power, tying it to the Commerce Clause underscores the argument that
challenges to such policies should be subject to ordinary levels of constitutional
review.
Ironically, the Chinese Exclusion Act itself—which supplied the occasion for the
Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Commerce Clause as the constitutional source
of the immigration power—is a paradigmatic example of an immigration law passed
to regulate the labor market.263 The Act applied exclusively to Chinese “laborers,”
not to most other categories of Chinese immigrants.264 In the Chinese Exclusion
Case, Justice Fields explicitly recognized that fear of job competition was a key
factor behind the passage of the statute.265 It is telling that in order to avoid reviewing
the procedures laid out in the Act for compliance with due process requirements, the
Court felt compelled to break with longstanding precedent anchoring the
immigration power in the Commerce Clause and create a new doctrine of plenary
power, constitutionally justified by the federal government’s control of sovereignty
and foreign affairs. Had the case been understood as a challenge to a procedural
aspect of legislation arising under the Commerce Clause, it would have been harder
for the Court to hold that Congress’s actions were outside the scope of judicial review
for constitutionality.
b. Immigration Policies Not Related to Employment or National Security
The middle category identified here consists of laws that set generally applicable
substantive or procedural terms for admission or removal, with few, if any, special
implications for national security or foreign affairs. This class of cases encompasses
the majority of challenged immigration laws and policies. In such cases, the
government does not argue that this specific law or policy is primarily motivated by
national security or foreign policy concerns, although it may suggest that it could
nonetheless have some impact on diplomacy.266 Instead, it advances the plenary
power doctrine in general, contending that this should minimize or eradicate judicial

263. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
264. Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); id. Preamble
(suspending for ten years “the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States”); id. § 6
(setting out procedures for “every Chinese Person other than a laborer who may be entitled . .
. to come within the United States” to obtain a certificate from the Chinese government
indicating that he met the entrance requirements); id. § 13 (exempting diplomats and their
servants); id. § 15 (“That the words ‘Chinese laborers’, whenever used in this act, shall be
construed to mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.”).
265. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 594–95
(1889).
266. For example, in Zadvydas, the government asserted that the Court should not review
for due process concerns its policy of indefinitely detaining noncitizens who had been found
deportable, without an individualized determination of dangerousness. While the government
conceded that there were no important national security concerns implicated by this policy, it
did argue that judicial review might “interfere with ‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations” and
thus impact foreign policy. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). See also Justice
Alito’s dissent in Pereira, discussed supra in note 252.
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review of immigration law for constitutionality without reference to whether the
actual policy implicates sovereignty, foreign affairs, or national security.267
The Supreme Court’s response to such arguments has been inconsistent. In recent
years, the Court has moved between applying ordinary standards of constitutional
review (often without rejecting or refuting the plenary power doctrine), and applying
the plenary power doctrine and deferring to the government. In cases where it does
the former, it has de-emphasized the idea that the immigration power is rooted in
sovereignty—but has not offered an alternative constitutional source. In the latter
cases, it has leaned heavily on the sovereignty anchor. In this category, consistent
recognition of the link between the immigration power in the Commerce Clause
would serve to counterbalance the government’s assertion of plenary power,
anchoring the government’s authority in an ordinary constitutional power that has
not developed pockets of exemption from judicial review.
A twenty-first century trio of Supreme Court cases on the detention of noncitizens
during or after removal proceedings offers an illustration of this inconsistency
problem and suggests the potential stabilizing impact of tying the immigration power
to the Commerce Clause. The cases are Zadvydas v. Davis, decided less than three
months before September 11, 2001 (“9/11”),268 Demore v. Kim, issued nineteen
months after,269 and Jennings v. Rodriguez,270 decided by the Court in 2018. All fall
within this middle category: they address due process challenges to aspects of the
Immigration and Nationality Act that relate to the detention of noncitizens during or
after the conclusion of deportation proceedings,271 with no reference to employment,
undocumented immigration, or foreign affairs. Indeed, in none of the cases did the
Court find that national security or foreign policy concerns motivated the statutory
provision at issue.
In Zadvydas, although the government asserted that the plenary power doctrine
required the Court to defer to Congress’s decision to permit indefinite detention of
noncitizens pending removal, the Court disagreed. It held that indefinite detention of
deportable noncitizens beyond the time when removal was reasonably foreseeable
was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.272 In deciding the case, the Court
recognized the “primary Executive Branch responsibility”273 in the immigration area,

267. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489
(2017) (No. 15-1204) (The Deputy Solicitor General opened his oral argument in this case,
related to the long-term detention of certain noncitizens during the pendency of removal
proceedings, a policy unrelated to national security or foreign policy concerns, by reminding
the Supreme Court that it had “often stressed the breadth of Congress’s constitutional authority
to establish the rules under which aliens will be allowed to enter and remain in the United
States.”).
268. 533 U.S. 678.
269. Demore v Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
270. Rodriguez. v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
271. The fact that all of these cases relate to deportation and not exclusion is significant,
given that the plenary power doctrine is understood to be much stronger as to policies relating
to noncitizens the government seeks to exclude than as to those it seeks to deport. See, e.g.,
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94.
272. Id. at 690.
273. Id. at 700.
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which “require[s] courts to listen with care”274 to the government’s arguments. But
the Court took note of the absence of any national security concerns in the case before
it,275 and considered and rejected the government’s assertion that its interpretation of
the statute to permit indefinite detention implicated foreign policy concerns.276 The
majority’s conclusion that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
would raise a serious constitutional problem”277 grew from an essentially ordinary
substantive and procedural due process analysis. Notably, the opinion did not once
mention the source of the immigration power, or even use the word “sovereignty” in
its opinion.
In Demore v. Kim, the issue before the Court was whether the government could
mandatorily detain all noncitizens pending deportation proceedings on certain
grounds (for example, because they had committed certain crimes), without any
individualized determination of flight risk or danger to the community.278 Here, with
the country still on high alert less than two years after 9/11, the Court took a very
different approach to reviewing the statute for constitutionality. The government did
not allege that the challenged policy was motivated by or impacted foreign relations
or national security. Yet in deciding the case, the Court tied the federal government’s
immigration authority to foreign relations and the war power,279 and emphasized
Cold War cases where immigration provisions were upheld under plenary power to
protect the country from Communism,280 thus waving the flag in a way that implicitly
suggested a link between the routine provision at issue and the need to protect
national security. It then relied on the plenary power doctrine to reach the conclusion
that the mandatory detention policy did not violate due process, despite the holding
in Zadvydas.281
After Demore v. Kim was decided, several circuits found that once a noncitizen
had been detained for some time pending the conclusion of proceedings, a bond

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id. at 695–96.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 690.
538 U.S. 510, (2003).
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523–25.
Id. at 521–22, 531.
While acknowledging that the government traditionally is held to higher
constitutional standards in proceedings for deporting a noncitizen, as here, than for excluding
one at the border, the Court carried out a very limited due process analysis, quickly rejecting
the claim that Zadvydas was the controlling case. Id. at 523, 527–30. In addition, the Court
relied on data provided by the government (retracted thirteen years later as false) to conclude
that detention times were shorter, and flight risk higher, for noncitizens mandatorily detained
before the conclusion of removal proceedings than for those in detention pending deportation
as in Zadvydas. See Letter from the Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Solicitor Gen., to the
Supreme
Court
(Aug.
26,
2016)
https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT2L-EG5G];
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, ll. 20–21, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489
(2016) (No. 15-1204) (Acting Solicitor General, for the government, in response to a question
from Justice Kagan: “Your honor is right that the statistics we provided to the Court were
inaccurate, and we apologize.”).
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hearing was mandatory to avoid due process concerns.282 The Second and Ninth
Circuits followed the reasoning in Zadvydas and imposed a six-month limit on
detention before an individualized bond hearing must be held.283
The Supreme Court granted cert in Jennings v. Rodriguez to resolve the circuit
split,284 and many hoped that the Court would clarify its view of the plenary power
doctrine in its decision. During oral argument on Rodriguez, the government opened
with a strong statement of the doctrine.285 A majority of justices responded with
skepticism that the Constitution permitted lengthy periods of detention without
opportunity for a bond hearing pending the outcome of a removal proceeding.286
Neither the litigants nor the Justices mentioned the constitutional source of the
immigration power. In its 2018 decision, however, the Court did not squarely address
the constitutionality of mandatory detention in this context. Instead, it held that in
requiring a bond hearing at six months, the Ninth Circuit had impermissibly applied
the constitutional avoidance doctrine to rewrite, rather than interpret, the relevant
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.287 The Court remanded the case
for an explicit holding on the constitutional question.288 The issue is thus likely to
return to the Court’s docket in the future.
A comparison between Zadvydas and Demore illustrates the Court’s tendency to
ignore the question of the constitutional grounding of the immigration power when
it is inclined to undertake ordinary constitutional review, but to return to the line of
cases rooting the immigration power in sovereignty when it defers to the
government—even, and perhaps especially, when the provision or policy being
challenged raises no specific foreign policy or national security issues. The result is
an incoherent doctrine, leaving the relationship of immigration law to the
Constitution (in terms of both power and rights) subject to change with the political
mood. If the source of the immigration power is important in one case, it is important
in all.
Recognition of the Commerce Clause as an anchor of the immigration power
would put the Court on a path to developing a constitutional jurisprudence for
immigration law that consistently identifies the source of the immigration authority,

282. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2494 (2016). Both circuits required bond hearings at the six-month mark.
The First, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have also required a bond hearing, but have tied
the timing to an unspecified “reasonable period.” See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d
1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland
Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
283. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015); Lora, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir.
2015).
284. Oral argument on the case was heard during the 2016 term, but after Justice Scalia
died and Justice Gorsuch replaced him, the case was put over for additional briefing and
reargument in the 2017 term.
285. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No.
15-1204).
286. Id.
287. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 850–51 (2018).
288. Id. at 851–52. The Court also directed the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a class
action is the appropriate way to resolve the issue. Id.
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and applies ordinary constitutional review unless there is an additional reason
(beyond the fact that the law relates to the entry or departure of noncitizens) for
deference.
c. Immigration Policies Related to Foreign Affairs and National Security
The third class of cases are those challenging aspects of immigration law that
explicitly address national security and foreign affairs, or those that the government
asserts were primarily motivated by such concerns. Where the government responds
to a constitutional challenge to an immigration policy by making an assertion that
the policy implicates security or foreign policy, the obstacle to judicial review of
rights is twofold. First is the plenary power presumption of deference for all federal
immigration actions. Second, both foreign affairs and national security have their
own deference doctrines, independent of immigration.
As to the first obstacle, scholars have suggested that the appropriate judicial
response to the government’s assertion that the immigration policy in question
implicates national security and foreign affairs would be a meaningful inquiry into
whether the policy actually is based on or meaningfully affects such concerns.289 In
this they seek to adapt the holding of Baker v. Carr, a 1962 case regarding a challenge
to redistricting, to the immigration context.290 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court
made clear that it would not find a question to be political (and therefore beyond the
scope of its review for constitutionality) simply because it arose, as this one did, in
the context of politics. In reaching this conclusion, the Court summarized its
jurisprudence on the justiciability of issues related to foreign relations,291 asserting
that
[o]ur cases in this field [foreign relations] seem invariably to show a
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility
to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action.292
Stephen Legomsky and others contend that courts should undertake a similar
assessment before determining that a particular immigration policy should be
reviewed deferentially because it implicates foreign affairs and national security.293
If the government demonstrates to the courts’ satisfaction that an actual risk to
national security motivated the particular immigration policy, constitutional rights
arguments would then face the challenges growing from independent traditions of
deference to the political branches on questions of security and foreign affairs.
Although a full examination of the arguments is beyond the scope of this Article,

289. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 63, at 160; Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 4, at 261–69; Lindsay, supra note 63, at 236–38.
290. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
291. Id. at 211–13.
292. Id. at 211–12.
293. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 63, at 160; Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 4, at 261–69; Lindsay, supra note 63, at 265.
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suffice it to note that, like plenary power, these deference doctrines have critics of
their own.294
Exchanges between judges and litigants in the context of challenges to the first
iteration of President Trump’s Executive Order suggested that at least some federal
judges were inclined to look behind the government’s assertions. For example,
during oral argument regarding the propriety of a nationwide temporary restraining
order on the Order, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington Judge
Robart responded to the administration’s argument that he should not question the
Order since it was justified by the President’s assessment of a national security risk
by stating, “I’m . . . asked to look and determine if the Executive Order is rationally
based. And rationally based to me implies that to some extent I have to find it
grounded in facts as opposed to fiction.”295 Judge Robart then ruled against the
President, issuing the temporary restraining order.296 The Ninth Circuit upheld his
decision.297 Such colloquies, and a number of the lower court opinions on the various
iterations of the travel ban, model the sort of meaningful inquiry regarding national
security considerations that should be more widespread when the government asserts
that they are the motivation for its actions in the immigration arena.
In Trump v. Hawaii, however, the Supreme Court demonstrated its reluctance to
engage in such a process. The majority asserted that it was applying rational basis
review to the plaintiffs’ claims that the President’s travel ban was intended to exclude
Muslims and thus violated the Establishment Clause.298 Yet the Court took an already

294. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
295. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, ll. 16–19, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-CV00141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
296. Temporary Restraining Order issued by Judge Robart, Washington v. Trump, No. 17CV-00141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
On the other hand, a district court judge in Massachusetts, reviewing the same policy
as applied to Logan Airport in Boston, referenced the plenary power doctrine and applied the
“facially legitimate and bona fide” standard to find the policy rational on the basis of the
assertion within the document that its genesis was a national security concern, and allowed a
temporary restraining order previously issued by the same court to expire. Louhghalam v.
Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36–38 (D. Mass. 2017).
297. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Similarly, in the
Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in Hawaii v. Trump, Judge Derrick
Watson of U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii temporarily enjoined the part of the
third travel ban, referred to as Executive Order 3 or EO-3. In his order, Judge Watson stated
that
EO-3 suffers from precisely the same maladies as its predecessor: it lacks
sufficient findings that the entry of more than 150 million nationals from six
specified countries would be ‘detrimental to the interests of the United States,’ a
precondition that the Ninth Circuit determined must be satisfied before the
Executive may properly invoke Section 1182(f).
Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Hawai’i v. Trump, 241
F. Supp. 3d 1119 (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC) (D. Haw. 2017).
298. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419–20 (2018).
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minimalist rational basis standard,299 and watered it down further. The third version
of the Executive Order must be upheld, the Court asserted, because “[i]t cannot be
said [of the president’s action] that it is impossible to ‘discern a relationship to
legitimate state interests’ or that the policy is ‘inexplicable by anything but
animus.’”300 The majority reached this conclusion only after sidelining as
“extrinsic”301 the President’s biased assertions about Muslim countries, individuals,
and the religion as a whole, both before and after his election. Once it refused to
consider these statements, the Court had a clear road ahead to reaching the conclusion
that the order did not violate the Constitution.
With Trump v. Hawaii as precedent, and a strong conservative majority on the
Supreme Court for years to come, it seems unlikely that the Court will be abandoning
the plenary power doctrine in the context of immigration policies with asserted
national security implications any time soon. As to other immigration cases,
however, there is more hope. At base, most immigration law is about economic
relationships between nations and within the United States. An immigration power
anchored in the Commerce Clause would offer a counterweight to the tendency of
courts to engage in only limited constitutional review of actions taken by Congress
and the Executive Branch on immigration matters. It would signal that, as a whole,
the exercise of the immigration authority is ordinarily subject to ordinary judicial
review. It would encourage courts to hold plenary power inapplicable when they
found that the policy in question did not, in fact, threaten national security or
implicate important aspects of foreign policy, rather than deferring to the
government’s routine assertion that it should always be free to act as it sees fit in the
immigration arena, because the power is rooted in its constitutional control over
sovereignty, and because all immigration law is an issue of foreign policy.
3. The Same End by Different Means?
Could the Supreme Court achieve a more normalized jurisprudence of
immigration in relation to constitutional rights without holding that immigration
power is derived from the Commerce Clause? As other scholars have noted, there
are alternative routes to the outcome this Article seeks.302 Most recently, in
Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” Matthew Lindsay argues that courts should
disaggregate the interests implicated by various immigration laws, “and recognize
both federal and state regulation of noncitizens for what it is: a variegated
conglomeration of laws and enforcement actions that concern labor, crime, public

299. As the majority states, “Given the standard of review, it should come as no surprise
that the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny.”
Id. at 2420.
300. Id. The Court found it significant that the Proclamation was issued following a set of
procedural steps beyond those taken in the drafting of the first two versions of the order, id. at
2422; contained provisions for waivers and exceptions, id. at 2422–23, however rarely applied;
and was “facially neutral toward religion,” id. at 2418.
301. Id.
302. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
supra note 4, at 261–69; Lindsay, supra note 63; see also supra note 62.
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health and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and national security.”303 He calls
for ordinary constitutional review of all immigration law except aspects that actually
relate to security and foreign policy.304
But to disaggregate immigration law, without disaggregating our understanding
of the origins of the immigration power, only goes half way. As long as the
immigration power remains understood as principally derived from national
sovereignty and foreign affairs, the default will remain a thumb on the scale in favor
of judicial abdication of constitutional review no matter what the challenged policy.
Others have argued that the courts should, and indeed already often do, apply
ordinary statutory interpretation principles in order to avoid reaching constitutional
questions, propose a burden shift that would require the government to demonstrate
an actual impact on foreign affairs or national security, or make frontal attacks on
the concept of sovereignty or the origins and coherence of the foreign affairs
power.305 Similarly, what would anchor those changes? Without a clear, new
articulation of the source of the constitutional power, the level of review of
immigration policy for constitutional violations will remain untethered, leaving it
vulnerable to drift with the political winds.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison that it was the role of
federal courts to review all legislation for constitutionality, it did not exempt
immigration from its scope. Nor is there an immigration loophole in the doctrine of
enumerated powers. Yet for the past century and a quarter, the Supreme Court has
rooted the immigration authority in a tenuous series of implications from
constitutional powers, and has repeatedly (if, of late, inconsistently) used that
reasoning to justify abdicating constitutional review of immigration law. The impact
of this approach on constitutional rights in the immigration context has been
devastating.
Plenary power was created by the Supreme Court in 1889 to cloak rank, racial
prejudice, fears about economic competition, and xenophobia in the vaunted
garments of sovereignty and foreign affairs. Today, immigration law in its vast
majority has nothing to do with foreign policy. The core questions that arise in the
field are about creating fair, rational, and efficient procedures to carry out the work
of a bureaucracy whose decisions touch tens of millions of lives a year in every nation
around the globe, with a direct impact on the U.S. labor market.
The task of modernizing and constitutionalizing federal court review of
immigration policy is complicated by the fact that no one aspect of the Constitution
covers all facets of immigration. Cognizant of that challenge, this Article has
advanced the argument that, in many circumstances, the federal government’s

303. Lindsay, supra note 63, at 186. In a previous article, Lindsay proposed returning the
immigration power to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as
Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2010).
304. Lindsay, supra note 63, at 186.
305. See supra Part I, notes 61–75 and accompanying text.
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authority to control immigration can be understood as derived from the Foreign and
Interstate Commerce Clauses.
Courts have made clear that the Foreign Commerce Clause grants Congress a
“plenary power”—but, unlike the immigration power rooted in foreign affairs and
sovereignty, one subject to judicial review for constitutionality. The Supreme Court
has never disavowed the Foreign Commerce Clause as a source of the immigration
power. It remains available to modern litigants and courts. Given the large number
of immigrants in the U.S. labor market, their interstate mobility, and the more
capacious standard for what constitutes “interstate commerce” today as opposed to a
century ago, there are strong arguments that the Interstate Commerce Clause is also
available to undergird the federal government’s immigration authority.
Some scholars would respond that a “dramatic new reading of the Constitution”306
is not necessary to cure the constitutional outlier status of immigration law wrought
by the plenary power doctrine. They would point out that in some, although not all,
recent cases, the Supreme Court appears to be quietly moving away from
immigration exceptionalism. The Court should be left in peace, they might say, to
apply ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, administrative law, and—on rare
occasions—constitutional review to laws about entry and removal, as it sees fit,
without the upheaval that would attend overruling plenary power.
This Article asserts by contrast that plenary power must be explicitly rejected, not
just pushed to the back of the shelf. Otherwise, it will remain ripe for revival when
national anxiety about immigration runs high and the political branches take action
against immigrants in ways that threaten core constitutional values. In its stead, the
Commerce Clause offers a coherent source of the federal government’s immigration
authority that can undergird broader constitutional review of many congressional and
executive actions in the immigration arena.

306. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 63, at 159; see also Johnson, supra note 4; Martin, supra note
63.

